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1) Preface
In May 1999, a group of researchers and students from the Department of Political and Social
Sciences and some colleagues from other countries got together for the third time in the
picturesque Campanian village of Positano. These meetings, traditionally labelled ‘Horizons’,
provide the opportunity to discuss recent texts on social sciences, international relations,
political economy, transformation processes and other fields, under the sun (and sometimes
the rain) of Southern Italy.  The context of this year's meeting, the public discussions, and in a
direct sense flight delays all over Italy made it unavoidable to take up the most urgent subject
for political scientists in those weeks: the military, political and cultural events in and around
Kosovo.
The participants got some 15 questions regarding the Kosovo crisis or rather, more exactly,
regarding possible consequences of the events for political science. These questions were
answered shortly before the meeting, and the answers were worked over after Positano. The
aim of this paper, however, was to preserve the spontaneous character of the original inputs.
Together with the protocol of the actual discussion in Positano, the questionnaire and all
answers are published below. Also, a connected but separate text by Klaus Segbers on the role
of Russia is added (text in German). The contributions by Sergei Medvedev are excerpts from
a forthcoming publication ‘Kosovo as fin de siècle of European Security’. An important note:
The contributions have been edited and repetitions deleted in order to enhance readability.
Thus, omissions in the contributions do not mean that the particular author did not regard a
particular point as relevant, it might just be the case that it is already expressed in a preceding
comment.
While stressing different aspects and advancing various explanations, most participants of
Horizons 1999 agreed in a remarkable way on some fundamental consequences of this
conflict which was much more than a Balkan crisis. German and Russian actors' role and
impact have to be reassessed. The future potential of military missions and the capability of
Western societies to wage war must be re-evaluated. The so-called new international order –
or disorder – is to be discussed, as well as the changing role of the UN and the Westphalian
principle of sovereignty. The possibly most interesting aspects may be related to the questions
of adhocism, virtual politics and missing agendas, possibly leading towards a new conception
of agency.
We hope to contribute to a due discussion.
Klaus Segbers, Simon Raiser, Björn Warkalla
Free University of Berlin, July 1999
2) Questions on the war in Kosovo
2.1 In the conflict in and around Kosovo and Serbia, who were the relevant
actors and parties involved, and what were their main interests?
RAI/BWA: Throughout the crisis, Milosevic's behaviour can best be explained by his
absolute determination to stay in power. For this, it was necessary to show the Serbs that he
was prepared to fight for a Serbian Kosovo, irrespective of the actual outcome. There were
two possible outcomes of his strategy: Either he had succeeded in forcing NATO to stop the
war due to public pressure in the Western states. In this case he could have painted himself as
the guardian of Greater Serbia and a Serbian Kosovo having expelled the Kosovo Albanians.
One could argue that his aim was a new Balkan conference in which he might have succeeded
in having the Balkan maps redrawn, possibly trading off parts of Kosovo against the right to
annex the Bosnian Serb Republic.
The second possibility was to concede military defeat in the face of the combined military
might of the 'evil' powers of the western world, betrayed by the fellow Russian Slavs. In this
case he could have claimed that he put up a brave fight for a Greater Serbia. In both cases his
actions would have been shaped more by the pressures of the dominant nationalist discourse
than by strategic and economic long-term interests concerning the fate of Yugoslavia as a
whole.
NATO wanted to promote itself as a world-wide guarantor of peace and stability at the
expense of the UN and other security regimes (OSCE, WEU). This is part of NATO's
attempts to redefine its role in the post-Cold War world, and to legitimise its continued
existence. Another aim was to show off the expensive high-tech weaponry and to justify
continued high-level military spending. An important objective was to intimidate future
aggressors and rogue states, a consideration that became paramount as soon as NATO had got
involved. It could not afford to lose the war, as NATO would have been discredited as an
effective organisation, especially in the year of its enlargement and 50th anniversary. Apart
from this, a comprehensive and coherent military and especially political strategy did not
seem to exist, however, and NATO was seen to be continuously overtaken by events.
USA: Clinton tried to end his presidency with a foreign policy 'success' to deflect attention
from the Lewinsky affair. Also, the US wanted to promote its role as the primary power in
world security issues at the expense of multilateral institutions (UN). The war showed once
again that Europe is not able to intervene independently of US military support and resources
(e.g. reconnaissance, transport).
US policy and the NATO strategy was heavily influenced by inner-departmental rivalries. The
Pentagon wanted to demonstrate the need for continued high-level military spending, as did
the military in the other NATO-states. The military establishment, however, was rather
reluctant in committing itself to the war, as it did not see a realistic chance of winning it with
the high-altitude, no-casualty strategy advocated by the Department of State. In the end, the
administration's fear of a public backlash in the event of American casualties proved greater
than that of the high numbers of Albanians that were bound to be displaced or killed under the
cover of the heavy NATO bombardment.
Germany: The new government wanted to demonstrate its commitment to the Western
alliance. Thus, the possibility of a new German sonderweg had to be ruled out decisively.
Also, the new government wanted to promote itself as an important player on the diplomatic
stage in Europe and elsewhere that carries diplomatic weight, e.g. with Russia. A more
pragmatic objective was to prevent a refugee influx from the crisis zone, the lion's share of
which would have had to be accommodated by Germany.
SIS: The international community with its diffuse interests and strategies wanted to interfere
or just to do something for the sake of justice. Thus, it legitimised the actions of NATO,
foremost the bombing, by acclamation.
NATO more or less slipped into the whole thing. It underestimated the situation and thought
that it could protect human rights with a spectacular operation. Once it had started the
operation it could not stop it, otherwise NATO would have lost its controlling power (See
Principal-agent-model) and that might have been an encouragement for even more cases of
human rights violations around the world.
Furthermore, is was not possible for NATO to lose a war in its anniversary year. In the end it
would have shown NATO in the same line with Russia, not being able to win the war in
Chechnya. And NATO is fighting a ‘good war’ like all the medieval warlords did. It is
fighting for some higher objective, where no room for compromise is left. As a consequence,
there was no clear agenda how to proceed with the war, but a clear agenda how to fight for the
survival and glory of the NATO: to demonstrate the world its importance, military power,
energy, decisiveness and so on, and promote itself as the relevant actor to enforce Western
moral principles.
The Serbs (or better the political elite) wanted to show that they are strong enough to set the
rules within it borders. At the same time, they functioned as the 'bad guys', uniting the
international community in the 'good war' called humanitarian intervention against them.
The Albanian Kosovars have been fighting for their right of secession from Yugoslavia. Their
struggle for the right of self-determination could be seen as a precedent for new developments
in international law. The UCK was determined to gain the status as the sole representative of
Kosovar Albanians' interests. This attempt was rather successful as the growing
marginalisation and irrelevance of the advocates of a peaceful solution showed.
MED: Interests at play in the Kosovo conflict were numerous and conspicuous, from the post-
Cold war NATO, desperately looking for a role, and a clear enemy, to the post-Lewinski
Clinton, willing to show, urbi et orbi, that he is, after all, a morally responsible statesman.
From the wish of the United States to reassert their position in the Transatlantic relations in
the wake of the Amsterdam Treaty and arrival of the EMU, to desire of the EU states proper
to prevent the inflow of a million Kosovar refugees. From interests of the military as sort of a
transnational elite (paradoxically, Gen. Wesley Clark has probably had more understanding
amongst the Serbian and Russian generals than on the Capitol Hill) to interests of the military
industry and technology.
In the world of postmodern technology, hardware, like computers, communication networks
and state-of-the-art arms, acquires a certain agency, and generates interests of its own. Anton
Chekhov once wrote that if a gun appears hanging on the wall in the first act of a play, in the
third act it should fire. Likewise, B2 bombers, top guns of our civilization, needed real-life
missions – and fly they did, taking off from a base in Missouri, refueling over the Atlantic,
bombing targets in Serbia, and returning to Missouri the same evening. As an American pilot
confided in an interview, ‘the great thing about flying a B2 is that you start in the morning,
accomplish a mission, and you’re back home by the evening, with wife, and kids, and a cold
beer’. Welcome to the world of postmodern warfare and computer morality. Never mind cost-
effectiveness of these B2 missions, they were all about media-effectiveness and a display of
technological supremacy. ‘The medium is the message’. B2 is a message per se; it does not
even have to do the dirty job of dropping bombs, all it has to do is fly, engaging in a
communicative action rather than physical contact with the enemy.
SGB: The actors involved and their interests are, in my view:
Milosevic - but it is hard to tell what finally drives him.
Bill Clinton, who wants to overcome Kenneth & Monica and relaunch his dying presidency
Solana, the tragic secretary-turned intellectual (see García Marquez' reflections on him).
The mass media.
All the non-involved separatists and anarchists world-wide.
The National Rifle Association (NRA).
Looking with some distance: all the military people.
SBO: Human rights movements in Europe and US had their message used and transformed
beyond recognition. They saw their human rights credentials abused for legitimising a war.
Also, the producers of the film ‘Wag the Dog’ played a certain role.
CMZ: Since the UN as a relevant actor have been paralysed by Russia's and Chinas tactical
obstruction, the only relevant actor from the so-called international community is US-lead
NATO. Despite the hype in the Media about Europe's new role, it is still the US that
command the resources, the know-how and the political will to enforce their policies.
However, it is true that the Europeans have, compared to Bosnia and Dayton, taken a more
prominent role on the stage; but I doubt that they have gained more influence or achieved a
more coherent policy.
When it comes to Serbia, the relevant actors seem to be a relatively small inner circle around
Milosevic, which rules Serbia without any obvious constraints by other sources of political
power, like the parliament, opposition or public.
In Kosovo, there are the hawks and the doves. The doves tried to stick to their policy of
stubborn, non-violent 'ignoring' of the Serbian policy. Whereas they succeeded in building a
parallel state, they did not succeed in preventing violence. So the hawks took over, and the
UCK, which pursued an active conflict-escalating role, is one of the winners of the war.
The most influential actor, however, was probably the Albanian refugees, as seen in the global
mass media. The real time images of the ethnic cleansing exerted a massive pressure on
policy makers in the West, which they did not want to resist, especially not after the lessons of
Bosnia. Historical 'learning' played a decisive role - had it not be for the lessons from Bosnia,
the western public and NATO had probably chosen a more moderate course of action, seeking
for a negotiated settlement. However, Milosevic had lost any credibility.
When it comes to interests and motifs, however, I cannot see any vital interests in realist
terms, neither for the West, nor for Russia. Kosovo is not about spheres of interest, nor is it
about relative gains for one state or alliance at the expense of other states. There are, of
course, secondary ‘realist’ interests, and they serve as additional legitimisers. The first was,
especially in the case of Europe, to prevent massive migration flows. The second was the fear
of a spill-over from Kosovo, to Macedonia and then Greece and Turkey. However, if these
had been the main interests, then the war against Serbia was neither a very effective nor a risk
limiting strategy to achieve these objectives.
A third realist explanation, which can be found quite often in the Russian media, assumes that
the west has a vested interest in opening up the Serb economy for global capital and aspires to
control the mineral resources in Northern Kosovo. I find this 'capitalist conspiracy theory'
rather unconvincing.
The real question is: Why did the West engage in a very costly war, if there were no real
interests in the realist sense? The answer can be found on four levels. First, there is a
dominant moral discourse, which claims that Europe and the European idea can still be saved,
after the short and bloody 20th century. If not now, when will the international community
take action against ethnic cleansing, and prove that they are willing to enforce, if necessary,
their humanitarian standards? The second factor is historical 'learning' – one Srebrenica was
enough. The third factor is public pressure, which had built up in reaction to the media
coverage of the ethnic cleansing. Last, it could be done! Serbia has no nukes, no real allies, no
serious air defence, no strategic importance and not many friends left.
To conclude: Strange as it might seem, NATO bombed for the sake of principle. Bombing,
however, was the 'easy' part. The other part depends on the success of a post war institutional
arrangement, which guarantees the safe return of all refugees, the international borders of
Serbia, a substantial autonomy of the Kosovo, and the minority rights of the Serbs who stay in
the Kosovo. If this can be achieved without forced or voluntary population change, then the
NATO bombs could have marked the beginning of a 'humanitarian powerpolitik', as opposed
to realpolitik.
Another question is how to explain the internal conflict between Serbs and Kosovars. It seems
to me that the term 'interest' does not grasp the dynamics of this conflict. In both camps, a
closed, exclusive, nationalist discourse dominated, and both sides suffered from a high degree
of pathological autism. In such an environment, there is not much room for the strategic
behaviour of interest-driven political actors. Short-term, fragmented action on the ground
prevails.
2.2 What was the Kosovo war about, and (for whom) has it been successful?
CMZ: It is still too early to give a final assessment of the war. My remarks are therefore very
tentative. First of all, 'war' has won, but peace not yet. And the NATO-war will find its final
legitimisation only when a viable institutional agreement is found for Kosovo and the Balkan
as a whole. Such a framework should rule out border changes and forced ethnic segregation; it
should include a changed federal framework and guarantees of minority rights.
What is new after Kosovo is clearly the fact that war as a means for peace is back on the
European Agenda – and there should be a open debate about that. Secondly, a lesson which
could follow is that peace sometimes involves ethnic segregation – an argument that is hard to
bear from a normative point of view, but that seems to have won some credits during the last
ten years on the Balkan.
What about winners and losers then? I leave this question in the first place to the Kosovars,
who can now return to the ruins of their homes and the graves of their relatives. Are they
winners or losers? As for international relations, there seems to me one clear loser, and that is
Russia. Whether 'Europe' will use its media victory to consolidate a political position remains
open. If the political will is there, then the window of opportunity could be used. For the
scientific community, I expect that it will address these questions (and not leave it entirely to
the politicians).
A third important question is not related to the war, but rather to the conditions of stability.
The Balkan is nowadays sadly enough almost automatically associated with conflict and war.
At the core of these conflicts lies the quest for a new institutional arrangement concerning the
relations between territory, the state, and ethnic groups. These conflicts surely need to be
explained and understood as a prerequisite for any future attempts to prevent or manage
conflicts. There is no shortage of potential conflicts in the region that have yet to turn violent.
In other words: Similar structural conditions do not always and not automatically translate
into violent conflicts. Rapid institutional change, as occurring in Former Yugoslavia and the
Former Soviet Union, can lead to new institutional arrangements on new, mostly smaller
scales; and these new institutional arrangements can provide stability in inter-group relations
and border management. The process of building a state and nation on the ruins of the lost
empires, although by nature a fragmenting and separating process, does not necessarily lead to
violent conflict. A key question is, consequently to identify what conditions foster new orders,
and what factors and actors are necessary to create a stable equilibrium in intra- and inter-
group relations.
SIS: After the end of the war, we are again confronted with chaos and awful pictures from the
Kosovo and are still far away from a political solution. All the states involved are much
poorer now, in terms of financial resources. We have seen again that war is a very expensive
game. Much more expensive than taking the right measures in good time. Appropriate
instruments of conflict prevention have not yet been fully developed. In other words, we can
fly to far-away planets, but we are not able to devise ways of handling human problems. Thus,
we should intensify our efforts to improve conflict prevention and finance research about how
to monitor future conflicts and how to prevent them from escalating. Another lesson of the
Kosovo war is that war is definitely not the right instrument to enforce the peaceful
integration of different ethnic groups.
STA: In game theory the 'chain-store game' could offer an explanation for the Kosovo war
based on 'reputational' logic. Since  the USA and NATO belatedly got involved in
Yugoslavia, they inadvertently acquired a reputational stake in the area, although they had no
real interests there. If we imagine the USA as a powerful chain-store company, then we might
say, it opened a branch in the Balkans. It has branches in many parts of the world, but there
are also many parts which are without. The chain-store giant has – due to economies of scale
– an unassailable, quasi-monopolistic market position. Nevertheless, single branches are
always vulnerable to attacks from local competitors who can undercut quasi-monopolistic
prices. If this happened everywhere simultaneously, the chain-store giant would lose its quasi-
monopolistic rents. Therefore, as soon as such an attempt is made, the single chain-store
branch launches an aggressive marketing and price-cutting campaign to close down the local
challenger, thus establishing or maintaining a reputation, which will discourage other
potential 'local heroes' from trying anything similar.
Thus, the actual political settlement to be achieved in the Kosovo is of little importance to
NATO and the USA. The main objective was to force the Yugoslav regime to conform to
American stipulations in order to maintain US reputation. In this, it has been largely
successful.
Moreover, even the general picture of the West ‘intervening’ in a region cursed by ethnic
hatred and conflict to keep the peace and prevent atrocities is a myth. The dynamic of events
in the Balkans has been permeated from the very beginning by the influence of the West, with
actors jockeying to position themselves with regard to the West: there are profits to be made
from supporting or defying the West. Thus, NATO air strikes were neither the catalyst for
ethnic cleansing, nor prevented it, but were clearly counted on by Milosevic from the start to
provide a context for escalation. The West deceives itself when it distinguishes between
‘western-orientated leaders’ and  ‘authoritarian nationalists’, since these profiles depend on
contexts and constituencies. The ‘political field’ in this area is structured with reference to the
West. This in fact is nothing new, since any national project of Balkan elites has defined itself
with regard to European elites, and been in reality just as much an international project. In the
19th century this was closely linked to cultural capital, now far more to political capital such
as the membership of nations eligible for aid and IMF funds etc being dependent on
democratic credentials.
BWA/RAI: One of the objectives of the war was to demonstrate NATO's continued relevance
and to legitimise NATO enlargement as a means of integrating trouble spots and containing
future threats to Euro-Atlantic security. A prerequisite was to demonstrate the West's
supremacy in terms of military power. The US asserted their status as the world's only
superpower and their dominance over the indecisive Europeans. Now, after the 'victory', a
precedent is set for self-mandated NATO interventions in other conflicts. One could argue
that the Kosovo war was a test case of the future role of NATO as the armed wing of US
foreign policy, cloaked in the rhetoric of a new international moral consensus. In the Cold
War, the superpowers had a negative veto in the UN Security Council. As a result of the
Kosovo war, the US now holds a positive veto: 'If you do not want to play according to our
rules, then we do it on our own.' This is a development that not only Europeans might dislike.
This war had to be fought to the end irrespective of the damage it would cause – it had to be
won because of its importance as a precedent. This was the basic concern of the US
government. In this context, it would be interesting to consult the literature on bureaucratic
decision-making as it occurs within a large organisation like NATO. When does the self-
sustaining interest to avoid defeat and to assert one’s importance and become paramount, at
which point do these dynamics eclipse the reasons and justification for the organisation’s very
existence?
Thus, it was a humanitarian intervention only in a secondary sense, and this only to show the
rest of the world that the West is willing to enforce its perceived common values even by
recourse to militarily action. NATO's actual strategy in the war and especially the ruling out
of ground troops from the beginning led to a dilemma, however. It lies in the logic of air
strikes that victory is defined not in a territorial sense, e.g. as the forceful expulsion of the
enemy from a given territory or as the prevention of atrocities by deploying troops that
actually separate the perpetrators from the victims or put a halt to the expulsion of refugees.
The logic of air strikes, on the contrary, demands the massive destruction of military and dual-
use infrastructure on a scale that suffices to erode the enemy's morale. Destruction is thus not
a collateral effect, but the very objective of air strikes and the massive scale of destruction
needed makes substantial civilian casualties inevitable.
This, in turn, was not compatible with the political objective of the whole operation which
was the protection of universal human rights. Also, one could pose the question whether the
NATO strategy of high-altitude bombing was fair, as succeeded in minimising own casualties
at the cost of quite substantial casualties among those civilians that NATO wanted to protect.
In addition to this, the very distinction between military and civilian casualties, and the
underlying assumption that the death of military personnel does not matter, is questionable.
This is especially the case if one supposes that not every soldier in Milosevic's army is a
marauding bandit and has volunteered to do his duty in the army of a nationalist dictatorship,
as Yugoslavia is portrayed in the West. Of course, these arguments might be considered
overly sensitive but they gain particular salience, again, in a war that is supposedly fought in
defence of universal human rights.
Another implication of the war was that, once again, the irrelevance of conflict resolution and
peace initiatives by NGOs at the grassroots level has been made clear. Many people warned
ten years ago that something would happen in the Kosovo. One could have tried to make a
difference already then. Instead, the West waited until the media coverage of atrocities
prompted them into action. The prevailing view now, not only in the US, is that there had
been no alternative to the bombing, as the OSCE mission in the Kosovo had not been able to
stop the ethnic cleansing. There would have been alternatives, but taking sides for the Kosovo
Albanians and against the evil Serbs from the very beginning was a mistake. It blocked many
options for a real dialogue and alienated the Serbs.
Besides, the choice of partners for the negotiations was rather peculiar. it is interesting to see
that the UCK, an underground rebel movement, was accepted at the negotiating table,
whereas in other cases, these kinds of movements are seen as terrorists and separatists, e.g. the
Kurdish PKK. The advocates of a non-violent solution to the conflict among the Albanians
(Rugova etc.) were marginalised from the very beginning and especially during the
Rambouillet negotiations. Did this happen because the escalation scenario had already been
decided in advance? This will probably remain an open question.
Another mistake was to concentrate exclusively on dealing with Milosevic, who knew how to
play the game from past experience. Instead, the West could have started at an earlier stage to
meet army generals (also in the Kosovo), and tried to convince them of the need to stop the
atrocities or to renounce allegiance to Mr. Milosevic. They might have been impressed by the
prospect of an eventual indictment and prosecution by the International War Crimes Tribunal
in The Hague. Or they might have been persuaded by a realistic exit option. Maybe they
would have not, but the impression gained ground that it was not sincerely tried.
Against the general assumption, the OSCE mission was not a failure. According to members
of the mission, the presence of the OSCE members contributed to de-escalation. The OSCE
mission would have been even more successful, however, if the international community had
been willing to adequately support it financially, logistically and staff-wise. As we have seen
in the months of bombing, in some cases the lack of funds is a problem that can be overcome.
The result, however,  was to discredit the OSCE as an ineffective institution for conflict
management and prevention, being supposedly unable to cope with such situations. Thus, the
impact the OSCE could possibly have, was severely limited from the start.
Still, the Serbs were cooperating with the OSCE and pulled back their troops, only to find
UCK fighters occupying the positions they had just left. This, in many cases, provoked an
even more brutal reaction from the Serbs. The following fights between Serbs and the UCK
were the reason for American demands to end the mission, and to start the bombing. This was
in the end of January, which means the Americans had actually been planning a military
intervention even before the Rambouillet talks were conceived. The Europeans did not resist
the pressure from the Americans, even though before the 24th of March there was no mention
of a planned and full expulsion of Kosovo Albanians in any report, neither by the OSCE, nor
NATO, nor the foreign departments of the states. Only after the bombing had started and the
OSCE members and relief agencies' staff had been evacuated, the Kosovo Albanians were left
at the mercy of the Serb troops.
This is not to say, however, that the NATO intervention was the reason for the mass
displacement of Kosovo Albanians, but it definitely provoked a more aggressive reaction on
the part of the Serbs. Besides, the aim of the intervention, to save a multicultural Kosovo and
to stop the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians was not achieved. The bombing hastened the
displacements and Nato was forced to change their publicly stated war aims from preventing
the exodus to guaranteeing the safe return of the refugees. Now, after Croatia, Serbia and
Bosnia, Kosovo has been ethnically cleansed, too. And it will be for decades to come. One
could argue that the risk of future conflicts has been diminished by the segregation of the
conflicting parties but this would seem a price too high to pay. And what about the ethnic
minorities in Macedonia, Montenegro and so on? It seems that accepting the logic of
segregation only serves to entrench the perceived differences between the ethnic groups and
create even more reasons for future conflicts. It seems that this war has been successful for all
the wrong people.
One of them is Milosevic; for him, the war has so far been fairly successful – he is still in
power. The opposition is weak and divided and, should it succeed in toppling him, prone to
continuing his political program without a substantial change in the ideological outlook. The
state bureaucracy, army and media are staffed with Milosevic’s cronies, which will ensure a
certain continuity in policy, as well.
SBO: The translation of humanitarian concerns over ethnic cleansing and atrocities
committed in the region, of the frustration with Milosevic, and of feelings of guilt over past
inaction in the face of humanitarian disaster, into the NATO bombing has been unfortunate, to
say the least. War has a logic of its own that seems to be virtually independent from the
political intentions that generated it. The bombing did not prevent and possibly precipitated
the exodus of the Albanian refugees, although I do not believe that it caused it. Documents
show that it was clearly in the making and Milosevic made all the preparations for it. The
problem is that the only 'force' that the European and American governments could rely on
was NATO. The bombing produced civilian casualties and created a newly volatile situation
in the region and helped unite Serbs under Milosevic's banner. The mentality of a nation
under siege with a propensity towards nationalism has its own logic. The propaganda on both
sides tends to substitute cause and effect (Serbian and Russian TV stressed that Albanians
were escaping the bombing, that NATO bombs caused the exodus). Virtual war should be
waged on TV, not in real life. This does not mean, however, that the European Left should
now fall back to the predictable anti-American, anti-NATO rhetoric. Yes, NATO has to be
criticised but New Europe should be criticised as well.  Now that the bombing has ended, I
also hope that the crisis will foster a comprehensive rethinking of the present moment, not a
falling back on predictable paradigms and conspiracy theories.
It would be wrong to speak of a success in the case of Kosovo, for another reason, as well.
There were many other potential Kosovos after the Cold War where the escalation of the
disaster was averted. What happened in the last ten years was:
* a progressive elimination of moderate and democratic movements in the former Yugoslavia
(Rugova, Democratic Movement in Belgrade, opposition to Tudjman, etc.), maybe with the
exception of Slovenia, the lucky rich sister.
* inaction in the Bosnian war,
* the lack of any long-term strategy on the part of Europeans to support and build alternative
democracies in the region and offer them financial support,
* the lack of consistency when it came to minority rights and human right abuses,
* turning a blind eye on both Milosevic and Tudjman's early abuses,
* the shameful non-inclusion of Kosovo into the Dayton Peace Agreement.
It should have not come to the extreme stance: NATO vs. Milosevic. This seems like a
nightmarish realisation of a sadomasochistic fantasy: the victimisers (like the Croatian ones
before that) became victims, the NATO targets drawn on the T-shirts of cosmopolitan, fun-
loving Belgradians became NATO targets, the exodus of Albanians did happen. The 'West'
did reveal its technological violence, strategic and tactical weakness, ignorance as well as
hypocrisy when it came to the value of the human life. I am afraid, however, that the whole
history of the Yugoslav war will be remembered through the current confrontation between
Milosevic and NATO; perpetrators of violence over the last ten years will be regarded as
heroes or victims, paranoid conspiracy theory will be seen as legitimate. No self-questioning
and 'management of the past', as it happened in Germany after Hitler, will take place, neither
in Russia nor in Serbia.  Will the critique of virtual war take place in US and Europe? I hope
so.
MED: Serb security forces have evacuated the province, but remained essentially undefeated.
The TV showed a dignified and orderly retreat of armed men, displaying Serb flags and
Victory signs. This army can still be used for oppressing dissent within Serbia, or for waging
war against Montenegro. The Kosovo Albanians are returning to what is left of their homes,
but KFOR, for all its good will, cannot prevent acts of revenge, the fleeing of tens of
thousands of Kosovo Serbs, and the rise of the para-criminal KLA. Like Bosnia, Kosovo will
likely remain the West’s protectorate for many years to come.
Moreover, one of the biggest bombing campaigns in history proved far from effective. The 79
days during which a relatively small Yugoslav contingent armed in the 1960s and 70s was
holding out against the mightiest military machine in the world and retained the capacity to
respond with anti-aircraft fire, were a remarkable achievement. Until the last two weeks of the
fighting, when the kamikaze tactics of the Kosovar guerrillas flushed the Serbs’ armour into
the open and rendered it vulnerable to NATO’s strikes, the Serb army had escaped serious
injury (The Economist, 12 June 1999, p. 17). Even if now Milosevic is toppled, democracy
installed in Serbia and independence granted for Kosovo (all of which is unlikely), the Serbs’
resilience, and NATO’s incapacity to degrade them and to stop ethnic cleansing during the 79
days, sent all kinds of wrong signals around the globe.
NATO’s decision to start bombing was a mistake in the first place, but once it had started, the
Alliance proved surprisingly obstinate and inflexible, yet hesitant and undecided. Despite
mounting evidence of the ineffectiveness of bombing, loss of civilian life, and the acceleration
of ethnic cleansing, NATO did not modify its strategy, and opt for a wiser halt in bombing or
a riskier ground option. This lack of flexibility and resolve is quite understandable, given that
NATO is an alliance of 19 nations ruled by consensus and by the politicians, not by orders
and by the military, but this does not add to the future credibility of NATO’s threat.
The overwhelming interest in waging a war against Serbia belonged not to a specific agency,
or a group, but to a certain power-discourse, the post-Cold war dominant moral discourse of
the ‘West’. Claiming to have norms at its core (e.g. NATO as a ‘community of values’), this
discourse is about expansion and power, much like the Christian discourse and the White Man
discourse that guided Western colonisation for the last 500 years under the banners of
morality. After all, any ethical discourse is a discourse of power working by way of exclusion
and punishment, by surveiller et punir (Michel Foucault) and the present moral assertiveness
of the West simply follows a centuries-old tradition.
In seeking to establish itself as a norm for global conduct, the moral discourse of power is
rather indiscriminate with respect to specific conflicts, instrumentalising them to its own
advantage. In some cases, this discourse supports sovereignty (Kuwait), sometimes it supports
human rights (Kosovo), and sometimes it supports neither (the Turkish Kurds). The ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, real and terrible as it is, seems to have been not an overwhelming reason
for western involvement, but rather a befitting pretext. In this sense, there has been no
contradiction between Idealpolitik and Realpolitik in the Kosovo, as they both were
manifestations of the same historical force, the same discourse of power. It was principle
exercised as power, and power disguised as principle.
The first war in history said to be fought on moral grounds has been tainted with hypocrisy. It
is hard to reconcile ‘normative politics’ with embracing an ally like the KLA, an organisation
with a well-documented history of terrorism, drug trafficking and ethnic cleansing, or with the
use of cluster bombs which proved to be ‘surgical’ in the most direct sense of the word, i.e.
amputational. Likewise, it is hard to reconcile the demand to abolish the death penalty that
Europe (primarily the Council of Europe) is putting before its member states, with the right to
kill innocent civilians for crimes committed by their leaders, that Europe asserted in the
course of the NATO attack.
Even if one admits that the war in Kosovo to some extent had moral foundations, this was the
morality of an action movie, the morality of western messianism and ‘chasing monsters’, the
morality of Good and Evil, Us and Them. It was the binary mapping of the conflict in Kosovo
(in which ambiguous forces like the KLA had to fall into ‘Us’ category, and western
journalists glorified the guerrillas on trails of war in the mountains, while a very unclear case
of Russia was relegated to ‘Them’ and identified as a ‘Serb ally’) that leads one to suggest
that Europe was not simply striving to establish morality and justice, but rather its own
identity, represented as morality. It was not some pre-established European norms that
compelled Europe to intervene in Kosovo, but vice versa: the intervention was used by
Europe to reinvent itself, and to imagine itself a moral fortress. Europe needed Kosovo for the
construction of its own identity, and for consolidating the European project on a higher moral
ground.
A ‘community of values’ is by and large an exclusive project working by the way of
dissociation from the Other. For decades (indeed, centuries), Russia, and later the Soviet
empire, served as the Other, creating a necessary external environment for the European
identity. After the Soviet empire had crumbled, the European project was suddenly lacking
otherness. On the one hand, Russia was still producing alien images (‘Russian nationalism’
and the ‘Red Mafia’ among them) but these were far from sufficient for reconstructing a post-
Cold war European identity that would provide the basis for EU and NATO enlargement and
include the nations of East Central Europe. And then, the Balkans erupted in the early 1990s,
and with that, a new kind of otherness was invented, comfortably rooted in the collective
memory of Europe. A new Other emerged in Europe, and a new fear: the fear of
Balkanisation.
2.3 What are the implications for Germany in its new sobriety between
Reichstag and Tetovo, the memorial and the Tornados?
STA: There are no new implications for Germany. That a federal government would support
American foreign policy whatever the parties in power was always clear. It is more or less a
definition of electability. Also, Germany cannot develop independent foreign policy
initiatives for fear of weakening the EU and, at the same time, questioning the Westbindung.
The EU cannot develop any security policy structure on its own, either, due to German
dominance and British abstinence.
BWA/RAI: The surprising lack of critical debate on the issue has shown that Germany is
already far more 'normal' than policymakers and newspaper commentators thought. There
doesn't seem to be much of a difference to other countries in the level of support for armed
intervention. Thus, the project of the peace movement, if that has been to strive for peaceful
conflict resolution and to prevent the German army from any engagement abroad that is not
purely defensive in nature, has apparently failed. The German Sonderweg is over. War as a
means of achieving political aims is gaining legitimacy again. This was not the case before
and it had taken pacifists a long time to get where we were before the debate on out-of-area
missions of the Bundeswehr started.
Another development became apparent in comments by Rudolf Scharping and others
comparing atrocities committed by Serbs in the Kosovo to the crimes of the Third Reich.
They were out of proportion and belittled Nazi crimes. But apart from the questionable
historical validity of the arguments, which was promptly and roundly criticised, they
demonstrated a willingness to leave behind the past and to strive for a new German
'normality'. The decision to abandon the Kohl-doctrine on no-go areas for the German army
and claims that, after all, Germany is on the side of the 'Good' fighting against crimes against
humanity comparable to those of the Third Reich should also be seen in this light.
CMZ: As a foreigner, I cannot really tell. I can only respect the cultural other! However, to
me it seems: Bonn moved to Berlin – nothing happened. Tornados are flying – nothing
happened. Germany lost to Croatia – nothing happened. They call the Bundestag Reichstag –
nothing happened. To me it seems that Germany is sober. How long will it take until the
Germans get sober?
MED: There was resolve and passion (Lev Gumilev's passionarnost') in German repentance.
Germany stood out in its restraint (even if it was a comfortable refuge). Now, German
‘normality’ turns out to be plain mediocrity, hesitance and neurosis. A divided Germany was
a Big Narrative, rooted in Modernity and Culture. A reunified Germany is a phenomenon of
postmodernity and civilisation, with all the inherent dullness of prosperity, and the fear of
putting it at risk.
2.4 What are the implications for Russia?
SIS: Russia now has the missing proof that she really was defeated in the Cold War. They are
the losers and NATO is the winner, who took all. They could now arrange themselves with
the situation and concentrate on more pressing issues. At the moment, however, Russia uses it
as evidence that the West is against her and behaves like a wounded bear, that is not willing to
try and find a new role in the world.
CMZ: The Kommersant Daily wrote in allusion to the new tranche of IMF credits: Burning
some US flags is fine, but we still keep the Dollars. Russia has no power to play any
constructive part in world politics – but she can be a nuisance. One could say: Thank God she
needs the IMF money. I think that exactly this dependence can be dangerous, though: Russia
knows about her dependence on Western money and about her own weakness. And she is
threatening with her weakness: ‘Take me serious or I get hysterical. Would you like to see me
hysterical? I am very dangerous when I am hysterical’. Russian elites are playing with the
west and with their own public, and everybody knows the game and everybody is playing
along, because it could happen that Russia is getting hysterical. But as we know from
everyday life – if this game is played for too long, nobody takes the players seriously
anymore.
Mikhail Ryklin wrote in Lettre about a friend in Moscow, who was very concerned about the
implication of Kosovo on Russian-Western relations. This friend feared that the fierce anti-
western demonstrations in Moscow, the sabre-rattling rhetoric of the Kremlin and the
manifest incompetence of the Russian foreign policy elite would harm Russia's standing as a
serious partner in Europe and the US. He was right. Contrary to what the media, especially in
Germany say, Russia is the big loser in the conflict.
Russia vetoed any UN resolution in the first place. Then she suffered form a short but violent
attack of hysteria (‘The Third World War is coming’). Then she cooled down, for two reasons
– IMF money is needed, and NATO was not impressed. Yeltsin sent Vikor Stepanovich to
Belgrade, with the difficult task to sell Milosevic NATO's demands. In other words – Russia
jumped on the NATO bandwagon when she saw that it was leaving – with or without her.
When an agreement was reached, Russia tried to sell this as her success, especially the fact
that the UN was brought back in. Nobody mentioned that he UN had been left out precisely
because of the Russian veto.
Then a couple of Russian parachuters seized the airport of Pristina and the future KFOR HQ,
twelve hours before KFOR was due to move in. Russia had given her word not to do this, and
therefore, not surprisingly, nobody in Moscow knew who exactly had given the orders.
Especially unknowing were the foreign and defence ministers. The Russians seized the
airport, but they could not feed themselves, so they engaged in trading with the Serbs and
KFOR – zhrat´ - to nado! In the end, Russia got her zones of co-responsibility and some mock
liaison officers – and had lost credibility and trust.
Of course, the seizure of Pristina airport has a charming aspect, and who was not cheering at
an over-confident NATO that found itself outmanoeuvred by 200 Russian soldiers and a
three-star general. But in the long run, Russia will lose from her erratic Balkan politics. She is
to weak to have real influence, so the best option would be to sell her symbolic influence to
the highest bidder. By the sort of politics we have seen during the last weeks, though, Russia
spoils the price even for her symbolic cooperation. Unfortunately, this will not change soon –
not under the condition of a quasi-institutionalised power competition. On the other hand,
who likes to cooperate with a partner like this? While the symbolic exchanges of mutual
respect (‘Without Russia, there will be no peace’) continue, the real message of the Kosovo
war is a different one: It would be good if Russia were reliable. But if not, who cares? And
that is bad news.
MED: The reaction in Russia to the start of the NATO air campaign was overwhelming and
unanimous. Deep-running political cleavages and partisanship were put aside for the display
of protest against NATO and solidarity with the Serbs. The West had delivered Russia an
eloquent and powerful proof of her defeat in the Cold War. In fact, the bombing provided a
basis for the consolidation of the Russian political elite and a large part of the population on
the anti-Western platform, playing directly into the hands of the Communists and nationalists.
Psychologically, there is a meaningful difference to Russia’s former geopolitical losses. The
withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were seen as a unilateral
gesture of good will (were they not?). NATO enlargement, for all its alleged strategic damage
for Russia, was still negotiated with Moscow, and got a reluctant Russian consent (the
Founding Act). But here, for the first time in the post-Cold war decade, something has been
done with demonstrative neglect of Russia.
This was a revelation. The taboo from the theme of Russia’s defeat was lifted, with some
profound psychotherapeutic effects. What followed was a two-week carnival of national
ambition, a ritual exorcism, complete with spontaneous mass demonstrations at the U.S.
embassy in Moscow, people volunteering to fight in Serbia, threats of supplying arms to
Milosevic and of re-targeting the Russian nuclear missiles, and a sharp increase in the
domestic role of the military. This emotional outburst proved once again, like the 1993 and
1995 parliamentary elections, that the post-Cold war syndrome runs deep in the national
consciousness. However, once the tabooed theme of Russia’s defeat is brought to the open,
the resentment is aired in a symbolic, verbal manner (popular demonstrations, Duma
declarations, etc.) and thus somewhat mitigated. Indeed, the steam of Russian nationalism all
went into the whistle. By mid-April the nationalist fever had calmed down. Admitting to the
impossibility of opposing the West or halting NATO bombing, Russia has taken on a rather
sensible position of wait-and-see, criticising NATO’s action, and gradually resuming
cooperation with the West along financial lines.
In the meanwhile, important domestic shifts were taking place. Primakov’s heavy-handed
mediation in the Kosovo conflict gave way to more flexible and Western-minded efforts of
the resurrected Viktor Chernomyrdin. Later, Primakov’s fall from grace was confirmed by the
sacking of his Communist-dominated government by President Yeltsin and the appointment
of Yeltsin’s protégé Sergei Stepashin. The composition of the new government and its
economic program were closely coordinated with international financial institutions. Largely
in response to that, large-scale cooperation between Russia and IFIs resumed for the first time
after the August 1998 financial crisis. Finally, President Yeltsin emerged out of the political
eclipse, scoring two major victories over the Communist Duma: first defeating the
impeachment vote, and then getting his candidate for the Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin
approved at the first attempt. The economy started showing signs of revival, the rouble was
strengthening, and the stock market was recovering from the August 1998 shock. Suddenly,
against all odds, Russia embarked upon a ‘liberal spring’.
In other words, just as the Russian political system managed to take the internal shock of the
August 1998 financial crisis, it is handling the external impact of the 1999 Kosovo crisis
fairly well, and there seems to be no long-term political fallout on the domestic scene. The
consequences for Russian foreign and security policy, however, are less salubrious. Speaking
generally, in the last 5 to 6 years, ever since the Kozyrev line based on liberal internationalism
and abandoning ‘national interests’ had faded away, Russian foreign policy has been
oscillating between minimalist cooperation with the West and damage limitation. The Kosovo
crisis has once again sent Russian foreign policy into the damage limitation mode,
undermining mutual trust and fragile mechanisms of cooperation with NATO. In a sense, the
West’s war in Kosovo has undone the political and psychological achievement of the 1997
Paris Declaration and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. From appeasing Russia, the West has
turned to sidelining Russia – a policy which is consistent with Russia’s dwindling economic
and diplomatic resources, but hardly sounds encouraging for the Russian elite.
The Kosovo crisis has had a dual effect on Russian foreign policy. On the one hand, it caused
some immediate damage in the relationship with the West. A more important fact, however, is
that Russia proved disinclined to surrender to neo-imperialist temptations, and remains
unlikely to slide into isolationism and confrontation with the West even under most adverse
circumstances. Russia was disturbed but not displaced. In this sense, the Kosovo story has
strangely added some positive value to the Russian-Western relationship, demonstrating that
Russia is being integrated into the New World Order, and will continue to fluctuate between
minimalist cooperation and damage limitation, while staying in the general framework of
dialogue with the West.
Moreover, after the initial neglect by the West, all of a sudden Russia seemed important, and
the West began looking for ways to involve Russia in the crisis management. Semi-isolated,
Russia unexpectedly started winning points on the diplomatic front. The Kosovo crisis created
a common information field, a common context within which a dialogue with the West
resumed. Indeed, one can see similarities with NATO enlargement debates which, too, were
giving Russia a voice at the negotiating table of European security for a good four years
(1993-1997). Both NATO enlargement and the Kosovo war were giving Russia an interface
with the West, providing a forum where she could claim her national interests which
otherwise would not even be heard. In both cases, Russia might have come out as the loser,
but these losses have raised the level of global awareness about Russia, her problems, and her
residual strengths. One is reminded of a daily ritual phrase, a magic incantation, repeated by
the U.S. and NATO leaders: ‘Our goal is to keep Russia involved’. In the world ruled by mass
media, it is perceptions and images that count, not the actual territorial/strategic wins or
losses. In both cases Russia was a Big Story of the global media, evoking distant memories of
her lost glory, and this partly compensated for perceived geopolitical damages.
SBO: We should not forget that there are many real human casualties in this conflict. The
implications of the war for the neighbouring countries are enormous and they were not
properly thought through by the ‘West’. Some ideals are also among the casualties. For East
Europeans and Russians this has been a crash-course in failed ideals – from the communist
utopia to socialism with a human face to the dream of Europe or a democratic West, Europe
without the Euro, and belonging to the West not being reduced to membership in NATO. I
wonder what happened to my generation’s dream of the West, and I am saddened that this
positive idea of the West is almost dead.
The thesis of a Russian ‘Lust am Leiden’ (lust for suffering), which is advanced by
commentators in the West and East alike, is a modern idea that the Russians got from
romantics from Germany and elsewhere who travelled through Russia in the nineteenth
century looking for the ‘others’ of the West in the ‘near abroad’. So there is no need to further
exoticise it. Russian peasants (judging from proverbs and folk art) were not into this ‘lust’ at
all, since they actually suffered. Survivors lust for other things in life. Subsistence,
perseverance, resilience in the face of external difficulties should not be confused with love
for suffering. The idea was taken up by Dostoevsky (his genius notwithstanding) who, while
writing great novels, had to some degree sentimentalised cruelty and turned ethics into a
melodrama. Today, we are dealing with virtual suffering. Russia is not under siege. On the
other hand, I think that in the early 1990s, the ‘West’ did not support democratic institutions.
Rather, it turned the idea of democracy into IMF demands, misunderstood Russian cultural
issues etc. Hence the resentment, that is not necessarily justifiable, but very understandable.
The last piece of Russian postmodernism that I encountered was hacker's art. When Russian
computer hackers destroyed the NATO site they left a message with a cartoon representation
of Beavis and Butthead. The signature was: ‘From Russia with Love’ ‘Down with NATO’
and KPZ (which is an abbreviation of the Soviet/Russian Police/KGB kamera
predvaritel'nogo zakliucheniia) The cartoon is quite witty. The ‘West’ should get the message
and get their ‘global popculture’ back from the hacker's hands like a boomerang. The
language of international (or American) popculture is not a key to democratisation or mutual
understanding. As for the message from the Russian side, it's hardly new, controversial or
countercultural. It is the view of the Russian government, a national nit-jerk reaction. So
medium (fun as it is) is not the message.
SGB: Some groups sort of needed the new war for some two weeks. To get something on
which to project their disappointment and furore. Now, the late and post-Kosovo sobriety
produces some pragmatism. As in real life. So the Russians have arrived in the global village,
after all. As we have maintained for years!
2.5 What about the peace movements? The nearer the war, the less
peaceniks?
MED: The difference to the 60s, 70s and even 80s is that nowadays you can be different
without joining any kind of ‘movement’ or other big narrative. There is no longer a
sociological rationale behind peace movements.
CMZ: The peaceniks have a problem – The Albanians (the good) are helped by NATO (the
bad). I remember a critical student at a Kosovo information evening at the Free University:
He heard the Serb position, the Albanian position, the Greek position, the Russian position ...
he got angry, he demanded the microphone and categorically demanded that we should all
‘kritisch hinterfagen’ (critically scrutinise) NATO and UCK. And if we did? Would we get
any clear answers? Would we be able to say yes or no decisively?
I guess not. Kosovo is a real challenge for people who are used to fixed, clear, ideological
positions. On the one hand, ethnic cleansing of that extent is not tolerable under any
circumstances. And there was no political way to stop Milosevic, as past experience clearly
has shown. On the other hand, nobody liked the fact that a war was taking place in Europe,
fought by a self-mandated military alliance, which has been looking for a new mission since
the end of the Cold War. Nobody likes the idea of this huge military machine, that runs
without giving much insight in its decision-making process. And nobody really trusts the
UCK, and rightly so. And still nobody wants to stand by and let ethnic cleansing happen. So,
not surprisingly, the debate on Kosovo was characterised by a deep ambiguity of all
comments, which is not altogether bad.
On the other hand I have not heard the intellectual who said: ‘Kosovo? I really do not know’,
although the admission of a deep moral dilemma could have been a fruitful input into the
debate. What I realised, however, is that many commentators complained about the
cowardliness of NATO's strategy. They thought that the no-risk strategy of high-altitude
bombings was not ‘fair’. Why did the notions of fairness and cowardice slip into the debate?
Did we not cease to mention these notions in connection with war two generations ago?
Where does the need for ‘fairness’ in a war come from?  I read this as yet another sign of the
deep moral ambiguity towards the war, a yawning moral abyss which some would like to
bridge with these notions.
RAI/BWA: The proximity of the war in the Kosovo certainly increased the awareness among
the population at large that something was going on there in the first place. Furthermore, one
could argue that support for the intervention has been higher, given the proximity of the
events, especially after the experience of Western inaction on Bosnia. Still, the geographical
proximity doesn't suffice to explain the low numbers turning out against the war and the high
level of support for the bombings. The silence of the peaceniks is better understood as a
reaction to the complicated nature of the war that is supposedly being fought in defence of
human rights. It has probably never been more difficult to be a pacifist than now, in the face
of a war that is not about oil or world trade routes. The complexity of the issue is also
reflected in the odd composition of the pro and contra camps in the debate. Martin Walser,
proponent of German ‘normality’, sided with the pacifists, whereas Ignaz Bubis, his liberal
counterpart in that debate, supported the war. Also, the post-communist PDS found itself in
the uneasy company of the far right in its rejection of the NATO intervention.
2.6 Are we willing and able, can we afford to wage war? When, and what
for? If the (post-)modern Western societies can only accept violence without
victims, will they lose any campaign?
SIS: We should not fight wars. It is the least civilised thing nations can do. It means going
back to a world of the ‘Naturzustand’ and disregarding the importance and possibilities of
international law and the UN system.
MED: Since most of contemporary wars are positioned in a global context, the art of ‘sending
messages’ (not only to the enemy but to the world at large) plays an ever increasing role in the
conduct of war, sometimes eclipsing operational efficiency. In older times, it was mostly
military parades that were part of PR, but now war proper, like NATO operation in Kosovo,
turned into a PR campaign. Apparently one of the reasons for the start of bombing in late
March 1999 was the illusion of an easy victory that would fit nicely into the festive context of
NATO’s fiftieth anniversary in April (see Javier Solana’s repeated pronouncements that the
campaign would be over by the time of the Washington summit).
What likens the NATO air strikes to a PR campaign is the goal to have zero casualties among
the allies, which is quite normal to a parade (unless an unfortunate onlooker falls under a
tank), but not to a war. This obsession with safety revealed a paradoxical nature of the
postmodern mind. On the one hand, a western man is ready, indeed willing, to wage wars,
releasing his archaic instincts, but on the other hand, his willingness to sacrifice has been
irretrievably lost through forces of hedonism, consumerism and atheistic humanism. That was
the main problem of the Kosovo war, a campaign that the West wanted to fight in gloves.
Kosovo was a truly postmodern war, an Oscar-winning action movie, a new 3D computer
game where one can employ his emotion and skill, and even be morally rewarded for
defeating the Evil—without risking own life. Postmodernism is an entertaining game on a
computer screen, but there happen to be real people somewhere underneath. The more virtual
a game becomes for ‘us’, the harder it turns out for ‘them’. The safer is the flight of an
American pilot in the high-tech skies over Kosovo, the bloodier the mess on the ground (both
from bombs and ethnic cleansing).
CMZ: I am a war-monger in that specific case. I think that this war was a bad option out of
terrible alternatives, and I cannot see how any peaceful solution could have been achieved.
The alternative to this war was watching the other war that was being waged against the
Kosovo civilians. Besides, concerning an pervasive argument against the NATO war: I do not
think that NATO made things worse – it only made them happen quicker. I find it cynical to
blame NATO for the ethnic cleansing, as some critics do. But this is a very dangerous
question, because it implies that Kosovo is a precedence, which it cannot be, because NATO
is not going to bomb all over the planet, and not in all conflict areas are the good, the bad and
the ugly that easily found. Again, without Srbrenica, there would not have been a NATO war
in Kosovo.
The other part of the question is to be answered by military specialists. So far, we have no
evidence that destroying a state's infrastructure from high altitude forces autocrats to comply.
And even if it did – ethnic conflicts do not need factories, bridges or power plants, nor do they
need authoritarian leaders. In short, it takes very specific conditions which make a war a
viable policy option to stop ethnic and other conflicts: A single leader(ship) in control of the
state; a state apparatus and army; an exit option for that leader(ship), like: ‘Stop the war and
you get en ‘European perspective’; the existence of an infrastructure to be destroyed (what
factories could be bombed in Somalia, Rwanda, or Sudan?); a civil population which will
blame their suffering at least partly on their leader; and no or low risk of retaliation.
BWA/RAI: It will still depend on whether vital national, i.e. economic or strategic interests of
Western states are affected. 'Humanitarian' interventions cannot afford casualties and are
therefore bound to be ineffective in a military sense. Also, the willingness of Western voters
to risk lives for abstract moral principles will be low.
STA: E.H. Carr and Carl Schmitt criticised the ‘hypocrisy’ of morality in the anarchy of
international relations as leading to disaster by ignoring real relations of power. Perhaps
nowadays it is easy enough for western leaders to gain the support for a (certain) war through
media reportage of horrific ‘humanitarian catastrophes’; however, if they rely on this, they
find their freedom of movement in pursuing military action massively limited by the same
media reportage (e.g. restrictions in the use of force and in the ability to catch the enemy by
surprise).
The idea that there is an aversion to seeing one's own soldiers killed is misconceived (at least
in Britain). If there is a clear-cut ‘national’ conflict like the Falklands war or the Northern
Ireland conflict, the death of (professional) soldiers does not decrease but rather increase
public enthusiasm, as long as the war is seen as being won or at least fought competently.
Remember that in the Gulf War high casualties in the ground attack were expected and
accepted.
SGB: My probably unpopular ‘personal’ position is that we have wars in our cities which we
are not ready to fight. We did, and we still do, accept violence, and we look in the opposite
direction. It is an uneasy coexistence. It signifies, in terms of our homes, more and more the
privatisation of public goods, especially of security. Does anyone fight this elementary feeling
of uneasiness, which is shared by young Russians, Turks, Kurds, and German kids in German
cities every single day?
2.7 Do the last weeks show that military power is (still) relevant? Or rather
on the contrary?
STA: Military power is relevant in wars in which an enemy is directly engaged, e.g. the wars
against Iraq or Argentina, but irrelevant in any sort of policing operations, i.e. maintaining
order on the ground, enforcing and keeping the peace, e.g. in Kosovo and Chechnya. In the
Kosovo war, there were two processes going on, to a large extent independently of each other,
and each exacerbating the other: first, ethnic cleansing on the ground with a whole variety of
armed units and bands fighting Kosovo Albanians and, second, NATO air strikes against
military personnel, hardware and infrastructure. There has been no war as such, there has even
been a strong degree of complicity between NATO and Milosevic in using the term 'war'. Nor
is there a 'Serbian military machine', nor is there (yet) a 'dictatorship' in Serbia, since purges
or wide-scale imprisonments have never occurred.
In general, since full wars allowing for the full deployment of military strength are very
unlikely given the West's monopoly on such strength (except nuclear weapons) that was
demonstrated in the Second Gulf War. Future conflicts are likely to erupt in circumstances
like in the Kosovo, i.e. low technology, 'guerrilla'-type campaigns where the West's formal
military superiority is not as decisive. The question is whether the West 'bites the bullet' and
enters conflicts like these on low-tech, 'hand-to-hand' terms.
BWA/RAI: The relevance of military power depends (naturally) on the type of warfare
concerned: Air strikes and high-tech weaponry are not effective in sub-state wars involving
paramilitary warfare, a blurring of the distinction between civilian and military targets, and
ethnic cleansing; military supremacy and high-tech weaponry are no substitute for political
solutions, they tend to increase tensions and decrease the likelihood for a lasting settlement.
The NATO-type of military power might still be relevant in 'traditional' inter-state wars,
whose likelihood, however, is decreasing in today's world. Military power that takes account
of the sub-state characteristics of wars, however, can be highly effective. This can be
witnessed in the relative 'success' of Serb Guerrilla and paramilitary tactics in achieving their
objectives of expelling Albanian Kosovars and defying NATO power.
CMZ: It is a paradox: The strongest military alliance the world has ever seen is tamed by
public opinion. They can threat but not really enforce. It was nicely illustrated in a cartoon in
the Berliner Zeitung: A smart weapon is cruising through a crowded street in a Serbian town.
It is embarrassed and says to an elderly lady: 'Oh – this is a residential area – how
embarrassing! Could you please tell me the way to the next military garrison?'.
If we will ever know what made Milosevic give in, then we might be in a better position to
answer this question. For the time being, I am not convinced that a high-tech-no-loss war fare
is enough to force determined, cynic autocrats to give in. One lesson, however, is clear: only
when the international community speaks with one voice will it be heard. And herein lies the
rest of the Russian bargaining power: Russia has lost her military or economic power or
political influence – but she can still trade her symbolic cooperation, although the price for
that is falling.
SIS: The last weeks have shown that human beings and their actions in the real world have
not really developed in the last centuries or even millennia. They do not match the
sophisticated theoretical developments in IR theory, where much is written about the process
of learning and institutional design. The war in Kosovo was another example for the right of
the strongest. Now we have to ask ourselves, is this a communication problem between
scientists and politicians or are there no other answers than military power?
Before talking about the relevance of military power, we should take a closer look at the
connotations of power. The term power is still linked to attributes such as being strong,
successful, to the definition by Weber, and so on. Powerful people do not discuss, they
decide. They do not talk, they take action. Here we are close to images like the powerful
lonesome rider (Sylvester Stallone, Clint Eastwood, John Wayne and the like). I would argue,
as long as these images are still sexy or, more appropriately in our case, give a political leader
the aura of being able to take control over the country, we have to talk about power politics
and about one of its most important instruments: military power.
In this sense military power is still relevant. It means that any leader who wants to be
powerful also needs military power at least for symbolic purposes. Who else should do the
parades? Being in charge of military power gives a leader the possibility to use it and,
consequently, he will use it. See here the independent existence of bureaucracies: when a
military force is established it has to find its duties, just to justify its existence.
The last weeks showed that all the sophisticated discussion about regime building, the impact
of transnational actors and so on are irrelevant as long as there is any attraction to violence.
This brings me back to the old demand of the peace movement: abolishing military power.
The military is still relevant to showing one's power, but nobody can handle it. What we are
witnessing are not wars between states, which armies were made for, but aggressive actions of
groups within a state against others. There is no clear-cut differentiation between the two
groups. Before they consider interfering in such 'wars', NATO or the UN should think about
alternatives.
Faced with NATO's eventual success, one could argue that, without NATO, peace would not
have been achieved. But all the atrocities coming to light now, clearly show that military
power is not a viable option in stopping ethnic conflicts. And last but not least: Fighting for
peaceful integration with military power sounds a bit paradoxical and it is so indeed, as the
revenge attacks of the UCK against Serbs in the Kosovo underline.
SGB: It is used, and it has effects. Especially collateral effects.
I did not serve in the German army (though I served in a psichushka), but I never was a
pacifist. Seems still to be the right combination, after all.
2.8 Does this conflict give our colleagues Macchiavelli, Huntington and
Gellner new legitimisation?
SBO: Contrary to all the Huntingtonian views embraced by the American right ('Pat
Buchanan-types') as well as the Russian 'left' (Communist leaders of the Duma), I don't think
that Kosovo had to happen. I don't see it as an inevitable conflict of civilisations; after all, the
'West' is supporting 'Muslims' (this time, even without the economic and strategic interest of
endangered oil-resources); and orthodox Christians from Bulgaria and Romania are not
sympathetic to Milosevic. I think that the problems in Yugoslavia are of a political, not an
'ethnic' or religious nature and that the European and American response to them has been a
political failure that escalated into a full-fledged military crisis. NATO should not have been
the 'main actor' in dealing with disaster in this region. Russian unconditional support for
Milosevic is a projection of resentment rather than 'Orthodox brotherhood'. Over the last ten
years, Russian media reporting on Yugoslavia was extremely skewed, even in the liberal press
and long before the NATO intervention. Virtually nothing was reported on the Bosnian war,
the siege on Sarajevo, the massacres etc. Instead, it was reported that they were staged for
CNN.
The 'Clash of Civilization'-argument is based on essentialist and analogical thinking. History
has already happened; now we are rehearsing the repertoire of ethnic hatred. I believe that
analogical thinking is dangerous on all sides. This is not the 'battle for Kosovo', not the Cold
War battle of NATO against a weakened Russia, not World War I, and not the Holocaust.
Learning from history and thinking historically means that one does not think through
analogies but analyses specific complexities of the given moment.
MED: As far as Huntington is concerned, he rather predicted the war of the West against
Islam, and the eventual alliance of the West with Orthodoxy. We still have to see that.
CMZ: If somebody got it right then it was – sad to say – Ernest Gellner with his dark
prophecy that nationalism, i.e. the congruence of state and culture and the idea that the realm
of the national and the political should be identical, can be achieved in the ‘East’ only by
violent ethnic cleansing? I am afraid that he has a point. But we should not give in to the
Yugoslav evidence, there is no automatism connecting state building, nation building and
ethnic violence – see Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, to name only a
few. Why did it not happen in these cases?
SIS: In my view, there is an important German missing on the list: Clausewitz. To some
extent it seems to me that this war is seen by NATO as the continuation of politics by other
means. NATO is not fighting for land or peace, but for fulfilling political objectives. It is
definitely not a war in the sense of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations. It is simply a war
about power.
STA: The use of economic sanctions, at least in non-oil producing countries, especially in the
case of Serbia is in fact an example of ‘token’ moralistic politics; a machiavellian approach
would have been the earliest possible and complete lifting of all sanctions against Yugoslavia
to encourage liberalisation from within. Machiavellianism in economic power politics from a
Western and American point of view is perhaps not imposing sanctions, but letting loose the
forces of economic integration.
SGB: Niccolo doesn't need any legitimisation. He is above that. I do like Gellner and always
would find a legitimisation for his explanation of nationalism. Even though he should be
converted into a historian.
2.9 Is this, after all, the revanche of the Modern against postmodernism?
STA: There's a Baudrillard piece about a 'stone-age tribe' discovered in the Papua New
Guinea jungle. An international symposium in conjunction with the local authorities decided
to lay a cordon of absolute exclusion for visitors and ethnologists alike around their entire
area of movement to 'preserve this unique biosphere', 'simulating' the undiscovered. The
'unique multicultural environment' in the Balkans, that has to be protected and preserved,
seems to be similarly simulated. Just as the aim is simulation, so are the methods simulation
of war. Through the ineffectiveness of these methods, nostalgia for the archaic can only grow,
as the archaic, primitive, and idyllic is continually being irrevocably lost, it is constituted by
its destruction and disappearance. Moreover, nostalgia for evilness is also in the air. The West
waits on tenterhooks for its worst fears to be fulfilled: whereas the nostalgia for the primitive
and rural is backwards-orientated towards the villages set on fire, the nostalgia for evil is
orientated to a point in the future when the mass-graves are opened, and the 'mystery of the
missing males' is solved.
Milosevic and other Serbian groups mock modernity? All nationalist movements have
oscillated between the desire to modernise, accompanied by a hatred of the less modern,
fuelled by jealousy of other's modernity. However, since there is now a monopoly on
modernity such that this modernity can deem itself universally valid, the jealousy of others'
modernity contents itself with mocking these universal claims by its very own displays of
violence against the less modern. Thus contemporary modernisation movements diverge
sharply between the Serbian and Polish or Hungarian examples: the universal claims of
western modernity are either fully accepted by modernisers, thus ruling out all forms of
violent and forced modernisation, or they are completely rejected in such a way that the
jealousy of others' modernity and the hatred of the less-modern fuse: the less modern (Kosovo
Albanians) are eradicated in such a violent way (by Yugoslav authorities) so as to mock the
universalist claims of the more modern (the West) and upgrade the value of their own
modernity. In this way, the universalism of modernity blocks itself. This might be
postmodernity.
SBO: Now that the 'end of history' and the 'end of art' has already been declared, why not
declare the end of postmodernism? The film 'Wag the Dog' was seen by many as a popculture
postmodernism that came to life: The president covers up his 'indiscretions' with a
manufactured war. Last year's events seem to imitate the film in an absurd postmodern
fashion with even more explicit sexual details. When Clinton ordered the bombing of Iraq, it
was easy to say that life imitates art. Or popculture. In the American imagination (mainstream
left establishment, the New York Times included) there seems to be no war possible without
TV sets.
In a recent interview, Dustin Hoffman (the popculture-1960s-'outsider'-type turned
Hollywood producer) was asked what he felt about the fact that 'Wag the Dog' was shown on
Serbian TV. He said that he was not disturbed at all. After all, it was just a film. He added that
while covering the impeachment hearing, the journalists in Washington would go back to
their rooms and watch 'Wag the Dog.' He seemed to find both equally amusing. In other
words, his 1960s beliefs turned into an ironic scepticism. The problem with this kind of
popular postmodernism is that there is nothing outside the TV.  Baudrillard said on the eve of
the Gulf War that the war would not take place. It seems that TV itself is wagging the dog.
The make-up artist will get an Oscar for the Albanians. Pop-postmodernism, despite its
apparent scepticism, does not upset the Western 'establishment' but fits into the media logic
perfectly well.
I would like to return to the modern. I am nostalgic for critical modernity and reflective
thinking that wasn't completely exhausted but rather made virtual by some postmodern
thinkers. Postmodernism has won! Down With Postmodernism! Theoretical postmodernism
was about the subversion of the 'master narratives' and the advocacy of difference. What
happened with the cooption of critical postmodernism into popular culture is that the
postmodern narrative itself became dominant and turned into a kind of cynical media
narrative. Who is to blame for the impeachment trial? The media (I advanced this argument
myself). Who is to blame for what is going on in Yugoslavia? Serbian TV. Who is to blame
for the bombing? NATO and its agents at CNN (or the other way around). As for diversity it
turned into a diversity of make-up only: each identity politics was based on the same palpable
narrative of victimhood, drive for recognition, economic share etc. Nabokov once wrote that
pornography was not about explicit sexual material, but about a certain form of narrative that
always produces the desired effect. It seems that there is something pornographic about the
propaganda war on both sides. The real victims were the nameless refugees whose documents
and even licence plates were confiscated on the border. Serbian civilians bombed by NATO
'by mistake' are also victims. One should not indulge in comparative victimhood, yet it is sad
to hear that cosmopolitan Belgradians, hurt badly both by the bombing and by the internal
political situation, never mention the refugees, that they say in passing that they fled from the
NATO bombs or, even worse that they staged the destruction and massacres for the Western
media. Thus, for them Albanians exist only on TV, dressed up American extras from ‘Wag
the Dog.’
SIS: It is not a revanche of the Modern, it is rather the evidence that we are far away from
living in a pure postmodern world. Living in a postmodern world does not mean that aims like
security and a decent life for everyone are no longer important. They are the basis, on which
something like a postmodern world can be built. When they crumble, the whole concept falls
apart, too, like the notion of postmodern human beings. Surveys show that values like
democratic decision-making rules and the freedom of speech are growing more important to
people. They are even more concerned about them than about their personal income. But this
only holds true when personal income is secure. The same is true for personal security or the
fear of aggression from other countries.
MED: At first glance, it seems that the Kosovo war was an outburst of modernity. Modern
history has returned with a vengeance, in particular the Balkan history, with its post-Ottoman,
post-Habsburg and post-Tito conflict potential. The shadow of Kosovo Pole, the memorial
commemorating the 1389 defeat of the Serbs at the hands of a superior Turkish force in the
Battle on the Field of Blackbirds (Amselfeld), suddenly loomed large over Europe, along with
a number of other unresolved territorial disputes, unsettled borders and ethnic rivalries in East
Central and South Eastern Europe. The conflict over Kosovo highlighted that the East has not
yet completed the tasks of modernity, i.e. forming nations, states, and defining borders. In the
age of globalisation and European integration, there turned out to be pockets of violent
modern nationhood. On the other hand, the West, too, seems to have relapsed into modernity,
making use of war and power politics, and waving national flags. British defence analysts on
Sky News would jealously count the number of sorties flown by the Royal Air Force in the air
campaign.
It would be too simplistic, however, to read the Kosovo war as a sudden recurrence of
modernity, nationality and military security in late 20th century Europe. To begin with,
Serbian, Albanian etc. nationalism is staged in a postmodern setting, i.e. this is nationalism as
a response to globalisation and integration. Each of the nationalist movements in the region is
surprisingly global, positioning itself with respect to the ‘West’, that is the EU, NATO, the
United States, but also with respect to Russia. Ethnic leaders are vying for the West’s
attention, and their strategies are addressed to the international community, as well as to their
direct opponents and domestic constituencies. That is to say that e.g. Milosevic is hardly an
archaic nationalist, obsessed with ethnicity, and trying to defy the West. On the contrary, he is
a pragmatic politician, playing the strategy of a regulated conflict with the West, and in fact
using the West for the purpose of consolidating his own power. Provoking the NATO attack
could have been Milosevic’s strategic (mis-)calculation with yet unforeseen consequences.
Likewise, international PR has turned into a major activity of the KLA and other Kosovar
leaders.
CMZ: It is a confirmation of the fact that the utopia of Modernity – purity, exclusiveness,
homogeneity, truth, single code, historical facts – can only be reached at an appalling price.
2.10 What do we learn about sovereignty after the crisis? Do only ‘good’
states or great powers have a right to be sovereign?
MED: The Westphalian principle of sovereignty, originally created by monarchs to ensure
their position against popular movements and systematically (ab-)used by rulers against their
own subjects, is eroding. In fact, the very Weberian principle of the state as the legitimate
monopoly on violence seems to be failing. In is no longer a sovereign that exercises this
monopoly but the international community. Basic human rights are being defined by the West
as universal principles, transcending sovereignty.
In the new normative paradigm of Idealpolitik, sovereignty is no longer an ontological given,
no longer inviolate. In some cases, it may be restricted (like Milosevic’s token sovereignty
over Kosovo today, or Saddam Hussein’s over Iraqi skies), in some cases simply revoked. At
a result, sovereignty, and governance writ large, can arguably be made more responsible and
accountable, encouraging greater public participation and observance of human rights. A
small question remains: is governance responsible and accountable to the indigenous
constituencies, or to the moral authority of the West, which is in some cases external to
domestic discourses?
It is interesting, however, that the Kosovo war also infringed upon the sovereignty of Western
nations, subjecting their alleged national interests to supranational purposes (NATO’s search
of action and leadership, preserving the Transatlantic relationship, shaping ESDI and CFSP,
preventing the refugee pressure on EU mechanisms, etc.) and to transnational technologies. In
the Kosovo war, the leading actors were not states (with a possible exception of the USA, the
last surviving nation-state), but institutions. The Kosovo story is taking place not in the
realpolitische field of traditional state interests, but in the highly virtual institutional field of
‘European security’.
CMZ: Sovereignty in a westphalian sense means the right of a state to internal control without
external interference. During the last decade or so, the principle of popular sovereignty has
been added. This means, first, the right of groups to be sovereign (here: the Kosovars) and,
second, that sovereignty derives from the people, is executed on behalf and for the people and
can be revoked if it is practised against the people. If a people is too weak to stand up against
violations of its right to self-determination, then the international community has the right to
intervene. The question, however, remains: Who is the international community? Is it the UN,
is it NATO, is it the OSCE, or is it a communicative consensus, mainly worked out by the
mass media?
Thus, sovereignty is not an objective quality which can be achieved by fulfilling some
criteria. It is an exclusive privilege which is granted to some and denied to others. How and
when? There are two factors: good PR is one, a historical tradition of statehood the other.
When it comes to the former socialist bloc, only those entities which had the status of Union
republics have successfully claimed sovereignty and independence. Chechnya, Kosovo and
Tatarstan, which were federal units on the second level, will not gain this privilege. But I can
see a tendency towards sovereign groups instead of sovereign states. While this will cause
huge problems, it is nevertheless a trend. Imagine: A global agency which registers groups as
sovereign, if they pass some tests. And every five years, they have to renew the test, or –
relegation to the status of non-sovereign groups.
SIS: We learn that sovereignty is nothing natural. It is connected to the state and established
in international law, but has no moral or historical basis. The concept of sovereignty is more
linked to a certain historical period. This period is conserved as the status quo in international
law, which does not mean that it is the final, unchangeable truth. The concept of sovereignty
was an appropriate solution for a particular problem, that evolved under special circumstances
in a particular time. As far as the external factors changed, we may have to rethink the
concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty was accorded to states to diminish the role of violence
and war in international relations. It was supposed to create stable islands, with a fixed order.
It worked at its time. But which concept could there be instead? Surely not the distinction
between good and wealthy sovereign states and poor and powerless dependent states.
SBO: While I think what happened was a result of a political error of unprecedented
consequences on the part of a specific American and West-European leadership, I do think
that nation states are weakened at present (through trade, investment, travel, porosity of the
borders, etc), and this is not a bad thing. As a former student of Spanish and Catalan culture, I
can say that the entry into the EU really helped ease the ethnic and national tensions. (The
same is true in the case of Britain and Ireland, and the Eastern European countries aspiring to
join ‘Europe’ – Hungary and Romania, the Baltic states, etc.) What is needed, as Gyorgy
Konrad claimed, is a consistency in the minority rights record. Thus, I do not think that
Croatia should not have been recognised a sovereign state, but it should have been recognised
with a proviso that it ensures minority rights. Hence, it is a matter of leadership and politics.
STA: The campaign demonstrates that not only has the value of sovereignty in real terms
diminished in the course of international integration processes, but this has begun to have
implications for the value accorded to sovereignty in international law. The decline of the
nation state is signified by a institutionalised (50 years) coalition intervening in affairs of
another state on ‘grounds of principals’ (or declaring to do so). Ethnic cleansing is not
unusual (all states have a history of ethnic cleansing in one form or another), unusual is the
intervention on grounds of ethics. Even the reasons based on ‘Realpolitik’ are non-nation state
in a classical sense: first, the prevention of mass immigration into the EU. This is a concern
because of obligations under international law to accept refugees and provide for them.
Second, the problem of internationalisation of diasporas (fears of a ‘Balkanisation of
Germany’) in the age of ‘space-time compression’.
RAI/BWA: The ‘good’ and ‘great’ powers who still enjoy unfettered sovereign rights are
defined by the Western powers. A ‘humanitarian Breshnev-doctrine’ is used to legitimise
intervention. However, this also signifies a possibly positive trend to a normative concept of
‘responsible sovereignty’. This could help promote accountable governance and adherence to
human rights standards if incorporated in a framework that takes the power to define ‘good’
behaviour out of the hands of the usual Western suspects.
2.11 Does anyone see on the Balkans elements of a new world order and
what are the implications for the role of the United Nations (UN)?
WAL: According to a common argument, e.g. put forward by Habermas in Die Zeit, the
Kosovo war heralds a new era in modern history by demonstrating the preparedness of the
international community to intervene in sovereign states in order to safeguard human rights.
Thus, the aim of the bombing was to secure an autonomous Kosovo within the borders of
Yugoslavia – the intervention was justified by NATO on the grounds that it secured the rights
of an ethnic minority which were victims of a genocide orchestrated by the Yugoslavian
government. This is seen as an important step forward in the development of international
law.
Instead of applying international law in a classical sense and legitimating the intervention
with a mandate of the UN Security Council, it was justified with a cosmopolitan
understanding of human rights: Citizens of one nation intervene in sovereign states on behalf
of their fellow citizens. This represented the development from the state citizen (Staatsbürger)
to the world citizen (Jürgen Habermas: Weltbürger). While the rights of the Staatsbürger were
already well established in many countries, those of the Weltbürger would still have to be
codified. A legal framework would also have to be established, but still, the war in
Yugoslavia was a manifestation of the principle that a state's sovereignty must be subordinate
to human rights. This argument, however, is flawed in two respects. First, it misinterprets the
causes of the intervention in Kosovo. Second, the implicit overall perspective seems
questionable.
The supposed change in attitude and principle among the international community or at least
among some Western governments is not easily brought in line with the conduct of the
Western world in other international conflicts. Why is Israel not sanctioned for holding on to
the occupied territories despite numerous UN resolutions? Why is there not more pressure by
the main Western powers on Indonesia with its long record of human rights violations on the
occupied islands? Why was there no sufficient interest in preventing genocide and bloodshed
in Rwanda? The list could be continued without effort.
I advance the following, more 'pragmatic' interpretation of NATO's intervention in the
Kosovo conflict: The governments of the intervening states were motivated by a mixture of
economic and political interests and extensive media coverage. It can be argued, first, that
particularly the European governments were ready to accept Anglo-American pressure for
military intervention as they feared that the humanitarian catastrophe in the Kosovo would
lead to a flood of new refugees. Also, there was widespread fear that an influx of refugees
would destabilise the neighbouring countries. The costs destabilising the Balkans were well
understood by the European Union.
Second, the impact of media coverage on NATO's strategy should not be underestimated. It
might be interesting to find out to what extent NATO's strategy and the course of the
intervention were shaped by opinion polls conducted almost daily in the US. One might
suggest that the outcome would have been less favourable for NATO if a majority of the US
citizens had rejected the idea to send in ground troops. As media coverage is highly selective
(just compare the cases of Rwanda and the Kosovo), a policy driven by the day-to-day
pressures of public opinion might quite often fail to defend human rights whenever this would
be justified on moral grounds. Regarding the role of the media, one should also consider the
(ab-)use of the 'fourth power' by politicians. For instance, there has been much discussion on
how far domestic problems (e.g. the Lewinsky affair) had an impact on the tough position of
the US against Iraq.
It was argued that the absence of a legal justification was not a basic deficiency of the
intervention in the Kosovo. This perspective seems to be highly questionable under at least
three aspects. First, if there is no written law which sets out the minimum requirements for an
intervention, it remains unclear which incidences justify attacking a sovereign state. In
particular, given that every war has immense external (or 'collateral') effects, it is an important
question who decides on whether the benefits outweigh the costs and who has to bear these
costs. As a result of the Kosovo war, apart from the significant number of military and
civilian casualties, the neighbouring states (Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia) got trapped in
a whirlpool of destabilisation, the Russian government came under heavy pressure, and the
Serbian economy was thrown back by at least a decade. Furthermore, it is still unclear how
the huge economic cost of rebuilding the neighbouring states can be financed by be EU states.
Second, there are always conflicting preferences among different nations regarding any
particular case for intervention that arise from the different interpretations of 'human rights' or
simply the economic consequences of a war. Thus, there is an inbuilt tendency that ad hoc
interventions will be heavily biased. The strong Western nations and in particular the US are
prone to abusing their economic and military power to both conduct interventions at will and
to impose the burden of financing them on the other states involved. In this respect, it would
be interesting to analyse how far the new Eastern European members of the NATO had only
the slightest chance of shaping NATO's strategy. In this respect, a major problem might be
that only the OECD- or welfare-states might be in a position to bring their national interests in
line with the 'new' requirements of the long-term moral standard of the UN. For many states
of the 'second world', e.g. Libya or Iraq, national sovereignty is an important political resource
to compensate for their unstable inner conditions.
Finally, it is astonishing that the warmongering governments are now silent on long-term
strategies how to reshape the international institutions and law in order to be prepared for
other conflicts of this kind. In fact, one could argue that such a discussion will not take place
at all, as these very governments seem to avoid any efforts towards institutionalising the
changes. This would necessitate the incorporation of a broader and therefore blurred
definition of the objectives and means. Besides, if e.g. the Security Council was reformed in a
way that decisions could be taken by majority votes, this could well backfire on some
Western governments.
From a German perspective, the most important implication of the Kosovo crisis may well be
the fact that Germany was ready to fulfil its role in NATO and did not choose a Sonderweg. In
my view, the main differences both in assessing the crisis and in the choice of means to end
the conflict arose between continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon states.
It seems that the US regarded the Kosovo crisis as an incidence where its superpower status
obliged it to intervene on moral grounds. In this respect, the intervention was already fully
justified by the perceived moral necessity. Moreover, with this understanding any further
measures should be evaluated according to whether they facilitated the fulfilment of the moral
task while incurring the least costs. Though continental Europe also recurred on human rights
principles to justify the war, the precise meaning of these principles as well as how the
objectives should be achieved was highly controversial. While it was US policy to 'correct' the
wrongdoings of a foreign nation, the continental European countries chose a more integrative
strategy (e.g., trying to include Russia in the negotiations, Fischer's peace plan etc.).
Additionally, there was a long-term perspective of creating an institutional framework for
future interventions of a similar kind. As such a framework would have to be agreed upon by
a majority of the states, it was considered vital that this ad hoc intervention received broad
support from the international community including Russia and China.
The Kosovo crisis allows for a variety of interpretations, which is also due to the divergence
in the positions of the participating NATO states, despite their demonstrated unity. One major
implication of the Kosovo crisis may therefore be that the perceived differences between the
members of the former blocs may well be exacerbated in the future and this could constitute
an opportunity for the EU (and in particular for Germany) whose foreign policy still has to
find its way.
CMZ: It is too early to say, whether this signifies the beginning of a new world order. I think
Kosovo will go down in history as the first war fought by ‘the west’ for the sake of principles,
and not for the sake of self-defence or relative gains. I doubt, however, that this will be the
paradigm of a new world order.
What would the opponents of NATO do without the UN? I remember Lafontaine's speech: ‘It
was no good to push away the UN’. In my view, nobody pushed away the UN – the UN
pushes itself away all the time, because it is coalition of important states, two of which say no
all the time. And Kofi Annan is very sad about that, but that does not change anything. So,
either change the UN from consensual to majority principle. Or: Let us keep it for the
ambience. And remember: If the UN speaks with one voice for all permanent Security
Council Members, then this voice is heard.
SIS: I think that we witnessed an important precedence, which will lead to a reformulation of
international law. A country’s border is no longer the boundaries of international concern. The
humanitarian intervention, which was until the Kosovo war just an option for the UN, will be
applied to other cases. International law will become more normative and give place to moral
aspects.
The lesson for the UN should be to stick to their agenda for peace from 1992 and to intensify
their diplomatic efforts. The UN are the only actor left which represents something that could
be labelled the international community. Within this framework they are legitimised to set
new rules that may serve as a common ground for international relations.
For some groups (in particular the nationalists) the intervention of NATO in a sovereign state
was a good example of NATO’s aggressive potential and it underlines their argument of the
need of a strong counterweight; this, in turn, gives NATO moral justification for its
enlargement. The world learned from the conflict that Russia in a way is still a power which is
far away from the western ‘Wertegemeinschaft’.
SBO: Whatever consequences this war will have, I do believe that a part of the new global
culture should be the enforcement of the laws against crimes against humanity (Nuremberg
Trial, 1948 Genocide Convention, Hague Tribunal, etc). The fact that the practices of the
implementation were faulted and that the rhetoric of the war against genocide has been used
exploitatively does not mean that the issue is not relevant. (Most of the best ideas and ideals
were used exploitatively – from humanism to Marxism to globalisation to sentimentalisation
of the local.)
STA: It should not be forgotten that Bulgaria and Romania have managed to contain ethnic
conflicts through party system and liberal governments with IMF support, and, thus have
prospects for eventual EU and NATO integration as a further stimulus for solving conflicts
peacefully. The NATO agenda is basically to incorporate on a step-by-step basis countries
which want and are capable of being incorporated. However, there is a problem of
ghettoisation of the countries not yet admitted, which means they react against NATO (thus
increasing NATO's self-justification). Thus, the NATO/non-NATO border is likely at some
point to become entrenched, against NATO’s own intentions.
SGB: I do not see or expect a New World Order.
On the UN: They are the ultimate regulative Idee. In other words: they will not ever work. But
they still are necessary.
BWA/RAI: The war in the Kosovo demonstrated the decreasing relevance of regional, non-
military organisations like the OSCE, as non-military means are apparently not sufficient to
stop serious cases of human rights violations. But rather than serving as a stimulus to further
developing conflict prevention capacities and to upgrading the OSCE financially and
logistically as a consequence of its apparent failure, the NATO intervention has demonstrated
to the world that military means are more effective, thus legitimising the role of NATO as an
international security organisation.
A lot of questions have to be raised in consequence, of which we attempt to answer only a
fraction: What are the criteria for a legitimate intervention, who decides when to intervene,
why in Kosovo, but not in Turkey, in Sierra Leone, or in Sudan? What about the future design
of International Law and international institutions? Will moral grounds suffice as a
legitimisation of interventions? Along these questions, one has to confront the moral dilemma
many left-wing and pacifist people face after the war. How to deal with a determined violator
of human rights? How to stop ethnic cleansing? Is there a place for morality in foreign policy
and international relations or is it rather a disguise for more mundane interests? In short: Does
the Left need a Kissinger?
Granting morality a role in international relations has always been a concern rather of the
political Left. A classic topic in that debate was the new world economic order. Leftists have
always demanded a more moral stance of the industrialised nations towards the Third World.
Out of solidarity and a moral responsibility towards their fellow human beings, people in the
North should care for the Third World and grant development aid and market access.
Although some of the demands were also formulated in terms of the West’s self-interest, it
was essentially a moral discourse. Now the Left is in power throughout Europe and in the US,
and people like Joschka Fischer, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair are responsible for a war that
was fought in the name of morality. Suddenly, people get suspicious of morals in politics and
especially of a moral justification of war –  and rightly so.
A number of concerns stand out. First, different people in different cultures have different
conceptions of morality. The debate on a perceived Western bias in the human rights
framework as codified in various international covenants and treaties is far from over.
Although a simplistic cultural relativism would ignore that every human being indeed
possesses some fundamental, inalienable rights, an international consensus does not exist
what exactly these basic rights are. More importantly, as soon as one tries to identify group
rights, e.g. the right of accountable and democratic governance or the right of self-
determination for people that consider themselves an ethnic group, one gets entangled in a
complicated web of cultural, historical and political traditions and vital political and economic
interests. The consequence is that the already small common ground disappears completely.
This leads to the problem of all human rights agreements. If the stated rights were explicit and
detailed enough to make a substantial difference, the states would not have signed the treaties.
And in order to make enough parties sign the agreements, the norms have to be formulated in
a way that ensures that they do not make a real difference or the enforcement mechanisms
have to be kept powerless. In short, an actual consensus on moral questions and, thus, on good
governance and the proper conduct of states does not exist.
Second, the debate on morality in international relations might be misleading or even
dangerous, as it ignores the real relations of power. Regardless of whether all actors can agree
on a minimum standard or not, the salient point lies in the process of agreeing on these
standards. As Habermas pointed out, a consensus on moral questions can never be reached by
coercion, as the process of communication is an integral part of this very morality. The
process of determining moral standards has to be transparent and free of domination by single
states or other actors.
This, however, is not the case in the ‘real’ world. The moral discourse is heavily dominated
by the West, the somewhat imprecise description of the web of formal and informal
institutions and regimes that govern the decision making processes. In the course of the
Kosovo war, the G8, the group of the seven most industrialised economies plus Russia,
assumed a diplomatic weight that it should not have had. NATO does not score better in terms
of transparency and accountability. But the same is true even with respect to the UN, much
heralded and demanded as the adequate forum for legitimising the intervention. The
dominance of the Western powers plus China and Russia on all matters of importance is
entrenched by their notorious veto-power in the Security Council. As this has so far been
justified by an overriding interest in preventing a war between the nuclear powers, NATO’s
self-mandated intervention has undermined the very reason for this exceptional role of the big
powers in the system of international institutions.
The UN still are the only organisation that can claim any legitimate role in shaping
international norms, as it is based on the principle of equal say of all states. To be of any
relevance in the future, however, the UN are in desperate need of reform. Leaving aside the
question whether non-state actors should also get a greater say in world affairs, the UN have
to be made more accountable and democratic. The Security Council in its present form is
outdated and should be changed. Numerous suggestions exists. They range from changing the
principle of unanimity to majority voting, to installing a UN Supreme Court, that would have
the final say on questions such as ‘humanitarian interventions’. The discussion is still on a
very early stage but it should be continued. In the worst case the UN would be reduced to a
relief agency without relevance in international security issues. The present state, however,
rules out the possibility of legitimising a war by recourse to morality, as the idea of a war
legitimised on the basis of the moral convictions of a small but powerful group of states
contradicts the very claim that a universal morality exists. However, this debate might be
relevant only as the debunking of a dominant ideology. As we found out above, in reality the
moral justification for the intervention was just one among a host of other, much more
decisive reasons for acting against the held belief that war seldom brings peace.
There are also a number of side-effects of the intervention in the Kosovo for the future world
order. First, a precedent was set for attempts to change international law by violating it and
the UN were discredited in their role as an organisation based on the strict observance of the
international law framework. Second, there seems to be less willingness in the ‘West’ to reach
an international consensus on security issues, illustrated by the fact that widespread
opposition around the globe was roundly ignored in the run-up to the intervention. Third,
military action as a means to achieve political ends has gained new legitimacy, thus reversing
the development of the last decades. Fourth, there were discernible attempts in the EU to
develop a coherent position but European dependence on US support has been vividly
demonstrated again.
2.12 Adhocism, virtual politics and missing agendas. Towards a new
conception of agency
STA: Whereas foreign policy was previously (at least represented as being) strategically long-
term planned in accordance with national interests, and in general fairly independent of
changes in government etc., and domestic politics was more linked with short term
perspectives and rapid changes in direction due to parties with very different orientations
competing, nowadays – as a result of international integration processes – the case is more
that domestic politics is determined by economic constraints and very consistent, (even in
Russia!), whereas ‘foreign politics’ – in as much as the term is relevant – are marked by very
short-term perspectives linked with ‘crises’ and instabilities which are in everyone's backyard.
Thus, foreign politics is marked by adhocerei. Moreover, American dominance means that all
international players base their actions around anticipation of American responses, making the
pursuit of any consistent (and predictable) foreign policy on the American side impossible.
Thus, it is possible to argue that the actions of both UCK and the Serbian regime were from
the very start aimed at escalation to force the US to intervene in the Kosovo question in one
way or another, and to profit from this in different ways.
MED: The Kosovo war featured a new concept of agency which roughly corresponds to what
the post-structuralist literary critics, following Roland Barthes, call ‘the death of the author’.
The Kosovo story has no author, it is written by impersonal forces like ‘Europe’, or the
‘West’, or the ‘community of values’, or the ‘New World Order’. Discourses have no face or
personality, and war in Kosovo is written by a collective body of the West, emerging in an
electrified field of symbolic exchange and simulation. The most striking thing about the
Kosovo war was that it materialized ‘out of thin air’ of late modernity. It has no author or
mastermind behind it (even though there are interests involved), and NATO is no more than
an instrument, an executor, a performer. In this way, the Kosovo war resembles Russia’s war
in Chechnya which now, almost five years after it had started, remains absolutely anonymous.
It is totally unknown who made the decision and gave orders to start it, whereas the roles of
the President, the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense are unclear. Considering the
covert Byzantine nature of Russian politics, the ‘truth’ about the start of the Chechen war is
not likely to be revealed any time soon (if this ‘truth’ exists at all).
The new concept of agency represented in the Kosovo conflict largely explains NATO’s
spectacular planning failures, and a general ad hoc and ad libitum mode of operation. Once it
became clear that NATO had failed to deter Milosevic from ethnic cleansing in the first few
days of the air campaign, the impression seemed warranted that the Allies had no agenda
whatsoever except continuing bombing with reckless abandon, driven by Napoleon’s motto
on s’engage et puis on voit. In an improvised field of events, increasingly panicky about the
evident inefficacy of bombing, NATO started looking for alternative mechanisms of conflict
management and/or retrospective justification of own action (which should have been
involved in the first pace): the OSCE, the United Nations, the Hague Tribunal, and finally the
EU and Russia.
Indeed, the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission has virtually saved NATO which by late May
1999 seemed to have been hopelessly stuck in the Kosovo quagmire, unable to stop bombing
on the one hand, and undetermined to employ the ground force on the other. Had not a
political solution been mediated in early June, one can quite imagine that now, in late summer
1999, the bombs would be still falling (with ‘collateral damage’ mounting), the ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo would have been completed, Serbian troops would be damaged but far
from defeated or driven out of Kosovo, cracks within NATO would be growing, and the
Balkan winter would be looming… An impersonal war machine of the West had to turn for
help to personal-style politics from the European peripheries (Finland and Russia); a marginal
discourse was needed to save the Grand Narrative of the New World Order.
3) Vom Nutzen und Elend Rußlands: Die Einbindungsdebatte1
Von Klaus Segbers
Neben vielen anderen Denkwürdigkeiten der Kosovo Krise gibt es einen weiteren Aspekt, der
politisch und politikwissenschaftlich von Interesse ist: Die Rolle Rußlands und die Rolle, die
Rußland von außen zugeschrieben wird.
Dabei sollte es eigentlich überraschen, daß ein Land, dessen Haushalt wesentlich von
Zuwendungen internationaler Organisationen und von Umschuldungsvereinbarungen mit
transnationalen Gläubigern abhängt, eine eigenständige Vermittlungsrolle zugetraut wird.
Tatsächlich hatten die Vertreter der Rußländischen Föderation (RF) zu keinem Zeitpunkt
dieses Konflikts eine Gestaltungsoption aus eigener Kraft. Woher, dann, rühren die
gegenläufigen Erwartungen?
                                                          
1 Dieser Beitrag erscheint in leicht veränderter Form unter dem Titel: Rußland einbinden. Vom Sinn und Zweck
einer Simulation, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 44.7 (1999), 829-836
Dieser Frage soll in drei Schritten nachgegangen werden:
1 Wie ist die internationale Aktionsfähigkeit russischer Eliten einzuschätzen?
2 Welche Rolle spielte Rußland für das Verhalten Serbiens und westlicher Regierungen
vor und nach dem Beginn des Krieges?
3 Wie wurde die Rolle Rußlands von den NATO-Staaten und westlichen Gesellschaften
vor Beginn des Konflikts eingeschätzt? Hat sich diese Einschätzung bisher geändert?
Zum ersten Problem. Hier stehen Beobachter vor einer klaren Frage. Sie können entweder
davon ausgehen, daß die Regierung und Eliten in der RF auf der nationalen und
internationalen Ebene mehr oder weniger aktions- und kooperationsfähig sind. Diese können
und müssen dann einbezogen und eingebunden werden. Sie agieren zumindest mit mittleren
Zeithorizonten, sind im internationalen Umfeld ergebnisorientiert und intern (innenpolitisch)
politik-  und implementationsfähig.
Die andere Möglichkeit der Deutung nachsowjetischen Elitenverhaltens besagt, daß
rußländische Regierungen eher Gruppenkoalitionen zur Verabredung innenpolitischer
Spielregeln auf Zeit sind, und daß sie international nicht zur strategischen Interaktion in der
Lage sind. Die Zeithorizonte dieser Akteure sind sehr kurz, sie selbst agieren durchaus
rational, sind in der Substanz ihrer Präferenzen aber nicht an internationalen Fragen
interessiert (allenfalls an deren innenpolitischem Tauschwert). Damit wären sie im Kern nach
außen nicht politikfähig.
Analytiker russischer Politik, die in den letzten Jahren die dort laufenden Transformationen
verfolgt haben und die nicht zu sehr durch klassische Ostforschung oder idealistische
Annahmen ‘realistischer’ Außenpolitik geprägt sind, werden es schwerlich vermeiden
können, für die zweite Position zu argumentieren. Das Problem dieser real realistischen
Position ist, daß sie wenig nachgefragt wird. PolitikerInnen, Medien, und das interessierte
Publikum sind unabhängig von politischen Prägungen und Präferenzen an diesen
Erklärungsansätzen ungleich weniger interessiert, als an Interpretationen, die staatsfixiert sind
und die die Annahme der Interaktionsfähigkeit russischer Politik nach außen machen.
Solche Annahmen sind jedoch irrig. Und die Gründe dafür sind struktureller Natur. Zwar gibt
es in Rußland wie sonst auf der Welt auch immer wieder unfähiges Personal und mangelhafte
Konzeptionen, Betrug, Korruption und ‘Verrat’. Doch sind diese Faktoren Begleitumstände,
die von wirklichen Ursachen institutioneller Inkonsistenz nicht ablenken sollten. So hatte die
RF auch in sowjetischen Zeiten keine ausgebildeten eigenen staatlichen Organe – im
Unterschied zu anderen Unionsrepubliken. Seit Beginn der beschleunigten Transformation
(Mitte der achtziger Jahre) und seit der Unabhängigkeit (1991/92) sind solche Institutionen
und Organisationen teilweise geschaffen worden (neue Verfassung im Dezember 1993,
bislang zwei Parlamentswahlen zum Unterhaus, neue vertragliche Beziehungen zwischen dem
föderalen Zentrum und Regionen sowie mit einzelnen Regionen, eine starke Präsidentschaft,
ein Verfassungsgericht und andere mehr), aber sie haben bislang nur eine geringe Prägekraft
entwickeln können. Die formalen Institutionen sind schwach und wenig durchsetzungsfähig.
Das wird – wenn man es wahrnehmen will – immer wieder deutlich. Zu allen außen- und
sicherheitspolitischen Fragen gibt es weder konsistente Positionen noch ein konsequentes
Außenverhalten. Reale Zuständigkeiten sind oft unklar, Äußerungen wechseln, mitunter
rasch, und sind widersprüchlich. Die Regierung der RF ist im traditionellen Sinn kein Akteur;
sie ähnelt eher einer Koalition, und zwar nicht zwischen Parteien, sondern zwischen
wirtschaftlichem Lobbies und sozialen wie politischen Clans. Lange halten solche Koalitionen
nie, was den raschen Verschleiß von Regierungen erklärt. Regierungsbildungen werden
weniger nach sachlichen und Kompetenzaspekten vorgenommen, sondern nach Seilschaften
und partikularen Interessen. Es geht dabei um die Nähe oder Ferne der Kandidaten und der
Gruppen, die sie repräsentieren, zu einzelnen Ministerien und um Zugriffe auf staatliche
Ressourcen, die sie in Aussicht stellen.
Verständlicherweise ist bei dem allumfassenden bargaining um Posten, Positionen und
Ressourcen die Behörde für Eigentumsfragen ungleich interessanter als das
Bildungsministerium, obgleich auch dieses den Inhabern gewisse Optionen bietet. Die
Operettenhaftigkeit der Kabinettsbildungen, wie vor wenigen Wochen wieder deutlich zu
beobachten, hat ihren Hintergrund in der allgemeinen institutionellen Schwäche, in der sich
daraus ergebenden hohen kompensatorischen Bedeutung von Aushandlungsspielen und in der
primärem Orientierung aller Akteure auf Ressourcenzugriffe. An allen anderen Fragen sind
Akteure in der RF derzeit und auf absehbare Zeit nicht oder nur instrumentell interessiert.
Ohne diesen Aspekt zu begreifen, wird es schwer bis unmöglich sein,  das Verhalten von
Akteuren in und aus Rußland richtig zu deuten.
Es kommt hinzu, daß der Staat in der RF nicht nur historische legacies und
transformationsbezogene Probleme hat, die seiner Stärkung im Wege stehen. Zusätzlich ist er
dauerhaft, strukturell und dramatisch unterfinanziert. Wesentlichen Aufgaben wie Unterhalt
und Modernisierung der Streitkräfte, Konzeptionierung und Organisation funktionierender
sozialer Sicherungssysteme, Einrichtung einer professionellen Verwaltung, Modernisierung
des Ausbildungs- und Gesundheitssystems, Investitionen in Infrastruktur kann er kaum oder
nicht mehr nachkommen. Der Haushalt 1999 (nominal 500 Milliarden Rubel, d.h. derzeit
etwa $ 20 Milliarden) ist nur zu etwa 50% durch Steuereinnahmen gedeckt. Hinzu kommen
Rückzahlungsverpflichtungen für Außenschulden von über $ 17 Milliarden in 1999. Aus
diesen Proportionen wird deutlich, daß der Staat auch finanziell  kaum handlungsfähig ist.
Schließlich gelten für die RF genau wie für alle anderen staatlichen Akteure weltweit die
Auswirkungen der Globalisierung. Regulierungen auf staatlicher Ebene werden immer
weniger effektiv. Klassische Aufgaben der Diplomatie werden durch inter- und transnationale
Regime und Institutionen überwölbt und teilweise ersetzt. Das Konzept von Staatlichkeit
selbst wird durch die Entterritorialisierung, Entmaterialisierung, Entsouveränisierung und
Entgrenzung von wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen Interaktionen zu einer Hülle, in der
Apparate zwar weiter agieren, aber zunehmend ohne Wirkung bleiben und funktionslos
werden. Das immer wieder neue und teilweise atemberaubende Hineinstolpern westlicher
Regierungen in das Ende des Ost-West-Konflitks, in die (formale, staatliche) deutsche
Einheit, in die Irakkrisen, und nun in die Kosovokrise verdeutlichen, das Politik zunehmend
nicht nach Meisterplänen und Konzepten gestaltet wird, sondern sich ‘ereignet’.
Außenverhalten der Regierungen ist oft ein Folgeprodukt von Spielzügen auf den
innenpolitischen Tischen: Politics by default, not by design.
Da kann man schlecht erwarten, ausgerechnet in Rußland wäre das Außenverhalten
zielgerichteter und reflektierter. Die hohe Akteursvielfalt, die klare Priorität innenpolitischer
Belange und Interessen, die äußerst kurzen Zeithorizonte der Akteure, ihre partikularen
Präferenzen und die strukturelle institutionelle Schwäche produzieren eine prinzipielle
Volatilität von Verhalten. Daran ist derzeit weder dort noch von außen wesentliches zu
ändern, solange die Anreizstrukturen für die relevanten Akteure so bleiben, wie sie sind.
Das hat natürlich auch zur Folge, daß es nicht sinnvoll ist, von ‘russischen Interessen’ zu
sprechen. Das gilt im wesentlichen auch für andere Länder, seitdem überall eine zunehmend
fragmentierte innere Akteurskonstellation mit sinkender Regelungskraft der Regierungen
einhergeht. Doch ist dieses Phänomen der Akteurs- und der Interessenvielfalt sowie der
daraus folgenden disparaten Handlungsstrategien in der RF besonders ausgeprägt. Das ist so
oft zu beobachten, daß es erstaunlich ist, daß noch immer von ‘Rußland’ und seinen
Interessen die Rede ist. Zur Klarstellung: Die Aussage ist hier nicht, daß russische Interessen
falsch, westlichen unterlegen oder nicht zu berücksichtigen seien. Sie sind vielmehr so vage
und uneinheitlich, oft auch gegensätzlich, daß sie beim besten Willen oft weder artikulierbar
noch einbindungsfähig sind.
Allein seit Beginn der Kosovo-Krise gibt es reichlich Anschauungsmaterial für diese These.
Die anfangs eher drohenden Einlassungen Jelzins riefen rasch Reaktionen aus den Republiken
in der RF hervor. Der tatarische Präsident Shaimiev verwahrte sich gegen die Entsendung
russischer Soldaten zur Unterstützung Serbiens und kündigte für diesen Fall die Aufstellung
von tatarischen Freiwilligenverbänden an, die auf Seiten der Kosovaren eingesetzt würden.
Die Verhandlungsbemühungen des Sonderbeauftragten Chernomyrdin blieben stets in einem
unklaren Verhältnis zur offiziellen russischen Diplomatie des Außenministers Ivanov und
zum Präsidienten-Berater Prichod'ko. Bei seiner Rückkehr aus Belgrad, wo der Durchbruch
zu einer Lösung zusammen mit Ahtisaari und Talbott erreicht schien, mußte Chernomyrdin
erfahren, daß General Ivashov aus seiner eigenen Delegation die Ergebnisse ganz anders,
nämlich als unzureichend, bewertete. Schließlich wurden am 11./12. Juni kleinere russische
Verbände nach Pristina verlegt, was vom Außenministerium desselben Staates als ‘Fehler’
und Mißverständnis bezeichnet wurde.
Daß westliche Politik und westliche Medien dennoch und unverdrossen an dem Bild eines
mehr oder weniger einigen, aktionsfähigen Rußland festhalten, hat viel mit einem tiefen
westlichen Bedarf an diesem Rußlandverhalten zu tun, und kaum etwas mit der Realität dort
(s. hierzu Punkt 3).
Zum zweiten Problemkreis. Die Rolle Rußlands in der Kosovokrise war – und bleibt –
gering. Um einen selbständigen, größeren Einfluß ausüben zu können, muß zumindest eine
von zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sein: entweder muß ein Akteur wirtschaftliche stark sein, um
für Verhaltensänderungen Prämien aussetzen zu können; oder er sollte militärisch
projektionsfähig und glaubwürdig sein, um Verhaltensänderungen durchsetzen, ggf.
erzwingen zu können. Am besten sollten beide Voraussetzungen gegeben sein. Im Falle
Rußlands trifft allerdings keine von beiden zu.
Die wirtschaftliche Situation der RF ist einigermaßen bekannt. Während die Lage keineswegs
so düster ist, wie oft dargestellt, und obgleich einige Sektoren, Regionen, Firmen, soziale und
generationale Gruppen sich erfolgreich mit den Problemen und Chancen des Übergangs und
der Globalisierung auseinandersetzen, ist das Land insgesamt nicht in der Lage, Prämien
auszusetzen. Faktisch ist es bankrott – trotz perspektivisch guter Potentiale in den Bereichen
Ressourcen und human capital. Diese Potentiale werden zunehmend aktiviert werden, und die
selektive Integration in Weltwirtschaft und transnationale Netzwerke schreitet fort. Doch die
staatlichen und diplomatischen Repräsentanten der RF können nach außen mit ihrer
Wirtschaft nichts Positives ausrichten. Wer die Wirtschaftsseiten der Zeitungen studiert, weiß,
warum.
Ähnliches gilt für die sicherheitspolitischen Probleme der nachsowjetischen Räume. Auch
hier gibt es eine deutliche und möglicherweise folgenreiche Untersteuerung von Politik. Die
konventionellen Waffen und Einheiten sind überwiegend nicht mehr einsetzbar.
Ersatzinvestitionen bleiben weitgehend aus. Soldaten und Offiziere verdienen mit
Nebentätigkeiten ihren Unterhalt. Manöver sind nicht mehr möglich. Eine russische
Beteiligung an ‘robuster Friedenssicherung’ auf dem Balkan müßte von westlichen
Regierungen oder Organisationen finanziert werden (bei 10.000 Soldaten würde das etwa $
150 Millionen kosten). Wohin all das führt, konnten wir im Verlauf des Waffenganges in
Tschetschenien beobachten.
Leider verhält es sich mit den Nuklearwaffen nicht um so vieles besser. Wegen des
problematischen Zustands der konventionellen Kräfte wird die Einsatzschwelle für – vor
allem taktische – Nuklearwaffen in der Doktrin und wohl auch in der Realität abgesenkt.
Zugleich wachsen die Zweifel an der Verläßlichkeit der Systeme – vor allem der
unterliegenden Kühl- und Kontrollinstallationen. Diese Doppelentwicklung ist äußerst
besorgniserregend – insbesondere in Kombination mit der Implementationsschwäche
staatlicher Strukturen (s.o.). Jedenfalls ist die RF auch sicherheitspolitisch nicht in der Lage,
auf dem Balkan oder sonstwo eine substantielle, eigenständige Rolle zu spielen.
Es bleibt, als Argument of last resort der Konsistenzverfechter, der Verweis auf den Sitz
Rußlands im Sicherheitsrat der UN. Der Zustimmungsbedarf für gemeinsame bindende
Resolutionen ist in der Tat eines der wenige Druckmittel, das russische Diplomaten
einzusetzen suchen – allerdings mit eher abnehmendem Erfolg. Über linkages und side
payments (IWF), und auch durch Koalitionen mit den realistischen und weltoffenen Teilen der
Interessengruppen in Moskau gelingt es zumeist, die formale Zustimmung Moskaus zu
erhalten. Wenn das nicht geht, wird eine wie immer vermutete Moskauer Position auch
ignoriert, wie vor Beginn der Luftschläge im März. Welche Position welches russischen
Akteurs jedoch jeweils ignoriert wird, wäre im Einzelfall zu definieren.
Generell gilt auch hier, daß alle relevanten russischen Akteure mit den bekannten inneren
Problemen befaßt sind. Nur wenn es gelingt, inter- und transnationalen Themen ein
außenpolitisches Profil oder doch einen Tauschwert für innenpolitische Bataillen zu geben,
gibt es eine Chance – wenn auch keine große –, russische Akteure auf Zeit in Vereinbarungen
und Regime einzubinden. Deshalb sind wohlmeinende Sorgen, westliche Interessen würden
russischen übergestülpt oder diktiert, fehlgeleitet – und zwar aus einem zweifachen Grund.
Zum einen ist die Interessenlage im ‘Westen’ ebenfalls sehr differenziert, auch in den USA,
was gelegentlich übersehen wird. Zum anderen deshalb, weil die konturierten russischen
Interessen, die von westlichen verdrängt werden, teilweise erst im Westen selbst konstruiert
werden.
Dahinter liegt übrigens nicht nur ein postsowjetisches Deutungsdilemma, sondern auch ein
fundamentales Regelungsproblem der Weltpolitik nach Ende des Kalten Krieges. Die UN und
ihre Mitglieder klammern sich nach wie vor an das Souveränitätsprinzip, das auf
nationalstaatlichen territorialen Ordnungen beruht. Zugleich wächst weltweit ein
unterschiedlich verursachter Interventionsbedarf gegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Hunger,
Seuchen und Anarchie. Dafür muß das Souveränitätsprinzip aber relativiert werden – die
Kosovo-Erfahrung sollte dafür die letzte und hoffentlich wirksame Erinnerung sein. Werden
die staatlichen Amtsträger – nicht nur in Rußland, sondern auch in den entwickelten
westlichen und asiatischen Industriestaaten – dem zustimmen? Sollte das möglich werden,
sollten neue Prinzipien transnationaler Interaktionen entwickelt und durchgesetzt werden,
dann wäre die so wenig faßbar scheinende und inkonsistent wirkende Akteurslandschaft in
der RF viel eher einbindbar: denn wichtige Akteure dort werden ja zunehmend in
internationale Kontexte eingebunden – zwar selektiv und partiell, aber das ist prinzipiell in
anderen Räumen nicht anders. Dann wäre rußländische Akteursgruppen gar Vorreiter
postmoderner, potsnationaler Regelungen und damit in trans- und internationale
Mechanismen und Institutionen integrierbar.
Die dritte Frage zielt auf die Perzeptionen Rußlands im Westen. Nach all den vorgenannten
Darlegungen scheint es erstaunlich, wie etatistisch die westlichen öffentlichen Erwartungen
an die RF sind. Und nicht nur die öffentlichen. Rußland, so scheint es, soll unablässig
‘eingebunden’ zu werden. Wie ein so komplexes, fragiles und volatiles Gebilde
‘eingebunden’ werden kann,  wird wenig bedacht.
An dieser Stelle muß wohl doch der Hinweis erfolgen,  daß diese Ausführungen nicht
normativ sind. Natürlich wäre es überaus vernünftig und politisch wichtig, ‘Rußland
einzubinden’. Die Frage ist, wie das möglich sein soll. Die Aufgabe erinnert daran, einen
Pudding an die Wand zu nageln. Heterogene und fragmentierte Gebilde lassen sich schwer
institutionell integrieren.
Dieses Argument hat aber auch eine Kehrseite: Einzelne Sektoren (Öl, Gas) sind längst
eingebunden. Einzelne Regionen oder Städte auch (Moskau, St. Petersburg, Novgorod,
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in den Städten sind so weltoffen und connected, daß man ihnen kaum noch
Transformationsbedarf zuschreiben kann – sie sind längst angekommen und gestalten eine
sich wandelnde Welt aktiv mit.
Das offiziöse westliche Streben nach immerwährendem Einbinden hat, wie mir scheint,
mehrere Hintergründe. Bei manchen mag sich der Eindruck festigen, daß es doch unklug sei,
stets gegen angenommene russische Interessen zu verfahren. Nach der Euphorie von 1989/90
– man erinnere sich an den Text der Pariser Charta – gab es in beträchtlichem Umfang
Hunger- und Finanzhilfen. Aber es gab auch starke Signale der Ausgrenzung: die NATO-
Ausdehnung, der Konflikt um die Beziehungen zum Iran, die Schläge gegen den Irak, und
nun die Kosovo-Krise wurden in dem Bewußtsein realisiert und geführt, daß ein Rußland, das
reaktionsfähig gewesen wäre, das alles schwerlich akzeptiert hätte. Andere favorisieren die
Einbindungsrhetorik, da sie Rußland als Gegengewicht gegen vermeintlich neoliberale Politik
und gegen Globalisierungsgeschehen einsetzen wollen.
Vor allem dient diese Losung aber dazu, von eigener Verwirrung abzulenken, und
hausgemachte Probleme zu externalisieren. Die Einbindungsrhetorik hat hier insofern eine
wichtige Funktion, als Bedenken gegen die Kriegsführung und ihre Folge, die in einigen
westlichen Kontexten als solche nicht direkt geäußert wurden, auf dem Umweg über die
Losung ‘Rußland einbinden’ ventiliert wurden. Damit können Grünen-Parteitage wie SPD-
Fraktionen, Medien und Bevölkerungen offenbar beruhigt werden.  Dabei ist die
Integrationsrhetorik so richtig wie folgenlos, da sich dieses Rußland nur formal, kaum aber
substantiell in irgend etwas einbinden läßt. Dazu ist die institutionelle Schwäche zu
ausgeprägt.
Anscheinend braucht gerade Deutschland einen besonderen Rußland-Diskurs. Der wurde
beinahe bruchlos vom angeblich realen Sozialismus mit der kurzen Unterbrechung der
Perestrojka-Jahre in die nachsowjetischen Jahre hinübergerettet. In neuem Gewande ist er
vitaler denn je. Die Konstante dieses Diskurses ist die Verbindung zweier Motive: Gefahr und
Versagen. Vor 1985 war die UdSSR notorisch unfähig (die Wirtschaft funktionierte nicht, an
Häusern hingen mehr Balkons, als es Etagen gab,  etc.) und zugleich gefährlich
(Rüstungsprogramme, weltweite Ausgriffigkeit).
Nach der Gorbatschow- und der frühen Jelzin-Euphorie, die sich am Neuen Denken, am
europäischen Haus, an glasnost' und perestrojka festmachte – und auch am Fall der Mauer –
wurde der klassische Doppeldiskurs seit etwa 1993 wieder aufgenommen. Die Ineffizienz läßt
sich jetzt an der langsamen Verwirklichung von Reformprogrammen und der angeblichen
Halbherzigkeit des politischen Personals festmachen. Und die Gefahr findet ebenfalls ihr
Material – wahlweise die Mafia und das Chaospotential. Nur Taube und Stumme wissen diese
Deutungen nicht elegant und unvermittelt in jedes Gespräch über Rußland einzuflechten.
Belege sind nicht erforderlich; die Medien kauen die Deutungsmuster wieder. Deshalb sind
James Bond -Filme so zeitlos – ebenso wie das West-Klischee russischer Frauen: stets
betörend-verführerisch und gefahrbringend.
Aber es gibt auch östliche Selbsttäuschungen. Ein (übrigens auch im Westen) gern bemühter
Mythos ist der von der gemeinsamen slawischen Identität. Die ist historisch wie aktuell eine
Fiktion. Als solche kann sie auch nicht gestärkt werden – höchstens ihre symbolische
Komponenten, soweit sie irgendwem nützlich sind.
Der artikulierten Empörung in russischen Medien und in der Duma liegt ein Diskurs- und
Deutungsbedarf zugrunde, der weitgehend unabhängig von der Realität seine Befriedigung
sucht. In Rußland ist auch eine tiefe ‘Lust  am Leiden’ (Michael Thumann) am Wirken, in der
die Empörung über die Bombardierung Serbiens in eine Erlösung umgedeutet wird: Virtuell
wird endlich Rußland bombardiert. So werden  Enttäuschungen über den bisherigen
Transformationsverlauf und über unrealistische, derweil schal gewordene
Integrationshoffnungen abgearbeitet. Wenn der Westen und die Zivilisation schon nicht in ein
paar Monaten, wie 1988 und noch 1992 erhofft, zu erreichen sind,  dann ist er wesenlos und
als Vorbild gänzlich ungeeignet. Das patriotische Jammern über den Ausverkauf russischer
Erde und heimatlicher Ressourcen, verbunden mit dem Praktizieren westlicher Lebensstile
kann mühelos in der Identifizierung mit serbischen Bombenopfern konvergieren.
Das Thema ‘Kosovo, der Westen und Rußland’ ist ein schwieriges. Nicht deshalb, weil es
Datenprobleme und Deutungsschwächen gibt. Sondern vor allem deshalb, weil die
‘Ergebnisse’ so stark durch die Erwartungen des Publikums und die ihnen nachgebildeten
Folien geformt werden. Wir machen zumeist unnötige und unrealistische Annahmen über die
Geschlossenheit und die politische Steuerungsfähigkeit von Staaten. Über mittelfristig
ausgerichtete und substantiell angelegte Problemlösungskompetenzen von Akteuren. Über die
Homogenität von Akteuren und die Abschließbarkeit von Räumen.  Alles Annahmen, die so
weder auf Deutschland wie auf Rußland zutreffen. Solange wir diese Annahmen nicht
aufgeben oder modifizieren, werden wir den Rußland-Diskurs des 20. Jahrhunderts
fortführen. Auch dann, wenn er von der Realität entkoppelt ist.
Das bedeutet nicht, Rußland und seine Schwierigkeiten liegen zu lassen – links oder sonstwo.
Es bleibt, eine Doppelstrategie zu entwickeln, die eine gewissen Simulation von Einbindung
wissend fortsetzt, um bestimmten Interessengruppen Angebote zu machen und um
Integrationsdruck aufrechtzuerhalten. Zugleich muß die Kontaktsuche noch ausgedehnt
werden. Vor allem sektorale, regionale, gesellschaftliche Akteure müssen stärker direkt
angesprochen und engagiert werden. Wenn dies nüchtern geschieht, ohne die traditionelle
Hast der Hunger- und Hilfsdiskurse und ohne eigene Überforderung, kann manches auch an
Kooperation gelingen. Prinzipiell lassen sich die  reale Unordnung der Transformationsräume
wie auch die partiellen Integrationserfolge von außen nicht ordnen und organisieren. Aber die
Möglichkeiten, die es vor allem unterhalb der großen Politik zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen
gibt, sollten genutzt werden. Pragmatisch und undramatisch. Die jüngst in Köln beschlossene
Gemeinsame Strategie der EU gegenüber Rußland ist im Programmatischen vage und eher
belanglos. Die Aktions- und Implementationskapitel enthalten jedoch durchaus praktikable
Passagen, die gesellschaftliche und institutionelle Veränderungen von unten ermuntern und
begleiten wollen – oder doch so gelesen werden können.
Das Nachdenken über Rußland muß nüchterner angelegt sein und entdramatisiert werden.
Dann wird es auch wieder Chancen geben auf zielgerichtete und wirksame politische,
wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Interventionen und Interaktionen – auf den Ebenen, die
sie dafür eignen.
4) The War in the Kosovo – Discussion in Positano/Italy, 13th –
17th May 1999
Why did Kosovo happen?
SBO: The conflict is about international post-modernism. In this context, it is relevant to ask:
what is the role of history?
BWA: History plays a rather strange role in this conflict: the references made are to events in
the distant past (Amselfeld; ground troops during 2nd World War), not to recent events, such
as the war in Bosnia, Croatia etc. The last ten years do not seem to be relevant (in the Western
media?).
MED: History is irrelevant, anyway.
CMZ: There are many potential Kosovos in the world. I wonder why only this Kosovo
happened and the others did not; and why did it happen now? If there is no real – e.g.
economic – interest for the Western powers to intervene in Yugoslavia, why did they get
involved in the first place? Was it to stop ethnic cleansing? Is the West bombing Yugoslavia
just for moral reasons? If this is the case it will have serious effects for the entire world order.
I wonder whether there is a direct link between morality and military action. Or did the West
intervene solely because of domestic constellations and pressure?
SGB: Moreover, an interesting question is to ask for the criteria of selection, why did
intervention happen particularly in this case?
BWA: The role of the media is crucial, they built up the conflict by showing the ‘right’
pictures. Then, something had to happen. Therefore, applying rational choice to the media
would be interesting in order to understand the self-reinforcing processes going on and also
the criteria applied in the selection of issues. Why do certain issues get on the media agenda
and others do not?
SBO: Interestingly, the case of Bosnia was different. Even though there was a lot of media
attention, nothing was done; so, this NATO-involvement seems like a late reaction.
MED: Bosnia was already ethnically cleansed when the West intervened.
STA: Also, the Kosovo conflict is much more one-sided, therefore it was easier to intervene.
Design or Default?
SGB: is there a text around the conflict that can be reconstructed? Did it all happen by default
or by design or strategy? I assume that in case of the West it was rather by default. In the
West there are two decisive factors: reaction to media coverage and to domestic constellations
or pressures. The whole action taken by the West was accumulated ad-hocism. This was not a
reaction to the Yugoslav conflict and its resolution, but rather a reaction to domestic
constellations; my consulting experience tells me that most politicians have no idea about the
subject or conflict etc. They just react to public opinion.
MED: I agree, there is no specific design, otherwise they would be/would have been smarter.
It is a decision-making process without proper advice. It was the same in Chechnya: There
was no plan, no will to win, only to destroy; otherwise ground troops would have been used in
both cases. The confusing aspect of Kosovo is that there are two wars going on at the same
time: Kosovo-Serb on the one side and NATO-Serb on the other; and one has little effect on
the other.
SIS: I do not think that it was only a reaction to domestic constellations. It was also in the
self-interest of NATO as an organisation. Why, after all, did it happen in the midst of NATO
enlargement celebrations?
SBO: Milosevic definitely had/has a design. The West, on the other hand doesn’t seem to
have a master plan. „We bomb today and do not know about tomorrow“; this is very post-
modern, but it cannot be in Clinton’s interest.
What did the key actors gain from the conflict?
SIS: The military complex is still very important to have. So, NATO had to show the world
that it is the most powerful military alliance that can intervene wherever and whenever it
wants to. Another reason would be to justify further NATO enlargement and to discredit
international institutions like the UN or the OSCE.
SGB: Furthermore, the prevention of migration to Germany, UK, France, i.e. containment of
refugees in the area. There was a lot of media coverage in the West and something had to
happen (domestic reasons)
The West thought: first Rambouillet, then the next step. NATO had postponed the use of force
three times.
BWA: Rambouillet was too difficult to sign for the Serbs, it would have amounted to an
occupation of Yugoslavia by NATO.
SGB: But otherwise, the Kosovo-Albanians would not have signed. That would have been
better for Milosevic than the current situation, however; now, the outcome will be a Western-
kept protectorate in Kosovo.
CMZ: There is no way to influence Milosevic. He will stay in power even after having
withdrawn the troops from Kosovo. He is a madman. But would it constitute part of NATO’s
failure if Milosevic stayed in power?
SGB: I do not think that he is irrational. He will be successful once the Western public is
turning against the war. He counts on that, which is very rational. His objective is to keep
Kosovo without the Kosovo-Albanians.
CMZ: If Milosevic stays in power, it is probably only a question of time that the conflict spills
over to Macedonia and Greece.
SGB: If it involved Macedonia, Greece would step in. As a result, Turkey would get involved
and within a short time, NATO would fall apart. This would be a very clever and rational
move by Milosevic.
What the West should have done
MED: Would ground forces have been an option?
SGB: The West should have installed safe havens for refugees with the help of ground-forces.
There would probably have been less casualties. It would have been feasible if there had been
the will to do it. It was a big mistake to rule out the option of safe havens in the first place.
There was a lack of resolve and decisiveness among Western governments. One gets the
impression that the West is unable to handle the major problems in the world due to
indecisiveness.
SIS: Like in Chechnya, the problem is the type of warfare – NATO forces would not know
who to attack. It would not be a conventional man-to-man fight.
MED: For me, ground troops are no longer an option. The West and specifically NATO has
already lost the war. The bombing is a face-saving operation. We are now entering a new
world order. One aspect is post-modern warfare. Its characteristics are: high tech and high
altitude bombing; fighting on a substate level; practically no casualties; no man-to-man
contact; the role of the media in transmitting pictures from the fighting 24 hours a day. As a
result, warfare gains virtual character, at least for us in the West, far away from the actual
fighting. The problem is, you cannot win such post-modern wars. Therefore, the NATO
intervention has been and will continue to be a failure. The message sent to the world is that
the West is unable to win a war on the substate level using high-tech bombing. This will have
serious consequences for the future.
SIS: There are two levels. On one hand, the war is still fought with conventional means as far
as the conflict between the Serbs and the KLA is concerned. On the other hand, the images
become more and more virtual.
SBO: This is the internationalisation of virtualisation. The war reminds me of the movie
„Wag the Dog“: Many Americans thought and may still think that Kosovo is all set up, as is
the war in Albania in the movie.
SGB: This conflict, whether post-modern or not, opens up windows for other potential crises
nobody cares about at the moment, e.g. in Belarus or in some African countries. Referring to
the ‘shadow of the future’, NATO has to win this war decisively and at the same time avoid
future constellations of this kind. The West had two options: either to stay out of Kosovo or to
intervene. Now, as it has decided to intervene, the war has to be won decisively. The problem
is that the West is not decisive at all. And Milosevic knew/knows that and could count on it.
Western indecisiveness was/is part of his strategy.
SIS: This is a principal-agent problem: NATO has to win.
SBO: Apparently, the only option for the West was to bomb Yugoslavia. But the West could
have and should have supported the opposition in Yugoslavia in the Winter of 1996/97. If
they had supported them then, there would be alternatives to Milosevic now. There is a lot of
civil society in Belgrade.
CMZ: The West never successfully supported democratic opposition movements. Besides, all
apparent Serbian opposition leaders are nationalists. Being moderate is a strategic position in
order to get Western backing. As soon as they gain power, they turn into fervent nationalists
again.
MED: There should be greater leeway for economic sanctions and pay-offs. The money spent
on the bombing could have been used more sensibly. Now, more and more innocent people
are dying because NATO has to continue the war until they can pretend to have defeated
Milosevic.
BWA: Only a small percentage of the money spent for the bombing would probably have
sufficed to prevent the outbreak of the war. But the West does not seem to be interested in
further developing and strengthening peaceful ways of conflict resolution. And furthermore,
why did the West not take Russian interests and objections towards a NATO-involvement
seriously? Russia could have been included earlier by economic incentives and as a result the
chances to prevent the war would have been higher.
SBO: I agree. The problem of Kosovo is ten years old and there was a latent danger of an
outbreak of the crisis. Experts warned years ago that the West should get involved
diplomatically to prevent an outbreak of a bloody conflict. In the last ten years or even after
the Dayton agreement there were many options to resolve the conflict.
RAI: The West should have done two things: Instead of slowly sending in 2.000 unarmed
OSCE observers, it should have quickly sent 20.000. Also, it should have tried to find
negotiating partners apart from Milosevic, e.g. Serbian generals.
The new world order
BWA: The biggest mistake was to start the war in the first place because it means that future
conflicts will have to be resolved by NATO and that other international institutions will be
further discredited.
MED: I would say that the new world order will be worse than the one we had. UN and
OSCE are gone for good, no matter how the West will try to save these institutions. It would
be hypocritical, anyway. This is finally the American world order they’ve been working for
the past ten years: empowerment of NATO as a military alliance under American control and
the further irrelevance of UN. But, as I said before, the other message for the world is that
even with high-tech weaponry and military it is impossible to win a post-modern war.
BWA: I dislike the idea of NATO under American direction enforcing order around the
world.
SGB: At the moment there is no real alternative unless you reform the international
institutions. And this is rather unrealistic. What we need is new principles upon which to build
the future world system.
BWA: How can you give up on the UN so quickly? There are ways to reform it to make it
more flexible and effective.
SGB: That is romanticism. Think of the veto powers USA, Russia and China. Do you really
think that they want to give up on their privileged position within the UN?
RAI: It is true that the UN is deadlocked. But does that mean that, in consequence, NATO is
the only alternative? What about Russia, what about China and what about wars that will be
fought outside the NATO area of influence? The danger is that this NATO involvement could
be a precedent for other countries to break international law and to intervene in sovereign
states on the basis of moral claims.
SIS: Military thinking is very close to economic reasoning: We all would like to be more
efficient. At least we feel better now, because we can say that we have done something. The
question is whether military involvement is the appropriate instrument to solve problems,
especially if you cannot - as we learned - win post-modern wars. I think we have to find new
ways for conflict resolution. Why is nobody bringing back the ideas of the Agenda for Peace
by former UN General Secretary Butros Butros Ghali?
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